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Abstract:
The idea of state territorial sovereignty occupied a central role in the political thought
of the fourteenth century. During this period, medieval society witnessed the
consolidation of the territorially sovereign state alongside other sovereign entities
such as the empire and the papacy. Political thought attempted to account for these
territorial entities and reconcile them with the dominant forms of medieval sovereign
power, such as imperial and papal claims for universal sovereign jurisdiction. Both
Baldus de Ubaldis and Marsilius of Padua made distinctive contributions to the idea
of territorial sovereignty. Their theoretical accounts therefore mirror the unique
circumstances of their historical context and thus reveal that they had specific
historical objectives in mind when writing their works. Baldus's political thought for
one constituted an acceptance of the universal claims of sovereignty of the emperor
and pope as the basic starting point, and from which he develops his argument for the
sovereign territorial state. His use of the juristic terms de iure and de facto
sovereignty were highly innovative. The theoretical nature of Marsilius's arguments,
on the other hand, were quite different. His objective was to destroy the papal claim
of universal sovereignty and accord it to the only legitimate sovereign power in the
state, the human legislator. Marsilius achieved this by developing a unique way of
understanding the sovereign territorial state, that is, by examining the structure, nature
and role of the perfect community or state. The impact ofmedieval political ideas in
shaping our modem political concepts should not be undervalued. The remarkable
historical change in late medieval Europe led to the fascinating and often discounted
contributions of late medieval thinkers to the subject of territorial sovereignty as a
whole.
Introduction
Stripped ofits irrelevant paraphernalia, the medieval period in which, as far as the West isconcerned, political ideas in the modern sense were born, is the period ofEurope's
apprenticeship, puberty and adolescence (Ullmann, 1965: 7).
The fourteenth-century is widely regarded as the most productive and profound era in the
development of political thought out of all of the Middle Ages. This period represents a
'fundamental shift in the nature of political thought' in general (Canning, 1996: 135). At the
level of discourse, political writing became especially sophisticated, as philosophers and
jurists alike sought to understand and question the complicated events of their time. One of
the major themes that preoccupied this discourse is the idea of the sovereign territorial state.
But how can this new orientation in medieval political thought be explained, since medieval
society is conventionally depicted as constrained by religiously inflexible doctrines of
authority and sovereignty, which mar its ability to produce anything remotely modem?
The fascinating answer to this lies in a major and significant development, which takes place
at the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth century, where medieval society witnessed the
'consolidation of the territorially sovereign state' alongside other sovereign entities such as
the empire and the papacy (Canning, 1996: 136). Indeed, by the late thirteenth century there
emerged a 'variety of kinds of territorial state, ranging from western monarchies, to the city-
states ofItaly' (Canning, 1996:83). This historical development was especially significant
for the history of political thought. It became the primary focus in the conversations and
discussions of fourteenth-century intellectual enterprise. It was a development that provided
the background and forum for the elaboration of new and distinct political ideas, as it sought
to question the role of the territorially sovereign states in the broader political context of the
empire and papacy.
Political thought attempted to account for these territorial entities and somehow reconcile
them with the dominant forms of medieval sovereign power that were prevalent during that
time, such as imperial and papal claims for universal sovereign jurisdiction. The theme of the
relationship between universal and territorial sovereignty therefore, was not coincidental.
Rather, the highly complex intellectual endeavours on state territorial sovereignty, evident in
fourteenth-century political thought, were undeniably products of this particular context.
This thesis is an investigation into this critical period of philosophical and political thought,
namely the Late Middle Ages (c.1290-c.1450). In particular, it is an attempt to contextualise
and analyse the political writings of two remarkable thinkers of fourteenth century medieval
Europe, Baldus de Ubaldis and Marsilius ofPadua, who both made distinctive contributions
to the idea of territorial sovereignty. It seeks to question one of the ways in which the issue
of state territorial sovereignty was historically conceptualised in political thought. It argues
that the relationship of the state to territorial sovereignty has become a conceptual given
since the emergence of the modem state in political philosophy. Max Weber ([1918]
1994:360), for example, offers one of the most widely influential and traditional approaches
to understanding the state. He defines the modem state as 'that human community that
successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given
territory'. Such a definition thus implies that a central feature of the state is the fact that its
jurisdiction and function is always bounded within a particular territory. Similarly, this idea
emphasises that the issue of territorial sovereignty is what makes the state different from any
other fonn of political association.
This thesis argues that any interest in modem political ideas must be accompanied by a
'heightened awareness of the need to understand how modem political concepts have
become what they are' (Ullmann 1965:7). The modem day view ofthe state, which clearly
underlines the relationship between the state and territorial sovereignty, is itself hardly a new
phenomenon. This is because, like most other concepts or political ideas, the issue of
territorial sovereignty did not unexpectedly emerge as a contingent feature of the modem
state. Rather, it is embedded in a historical process, which is both fluid and varied. It can thus
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be described as historically continuous, having arisen in past historical moments, and then
assuming a unique flavour and currency in the political realities of a later time. Furthermore,
although past political ideas often assume different forms in later contexts, as Ullmann
(1965 :8) suggests, in 'their substance, there is a remarkable genetic continuity'.
Following from this, this thesis will defend the assertion that the modern understanding of
the political significance of territorial sovereignty in relation to the state, if examined within
the overriding framework of the history of political ideas, may have its intellectual origins in
the late Medieval Period. The thesis is thus predicated on the assumption that a
comprehension of politics and more specifically the state is deeply mired in history. It argues
that many medieval political concepts such as territorial sovereignty, would be either
'absorbed, transformed, or argued against until the modern period' (Coleman, 1999: 1).
Bearing this in mind, this thesis can be largely described as an analytical attempt to trace the
intellectual origins of the idea of state territorial sovereignty. It does not claim to purport that
that one can squarely and neatly argue that the intellectual origins of territorial sovereignty
are to be found in the late Medieval period. Instead, it hopes to illustrate through the lens of
the 'history of ideas' that remarkable historical change in late medieval Europe led to the
fascinating and often discounted contributions of medieval thinkers to the subject of
territorial sovereignty as a whole. Thus, a historical analysis of territorial sovereignty would
simply be deficient if it were not to recognise the intellectual and historical importance of
this period.
In Chapter One of this thesis, I examine the contributions of the jurists and civilian lawyers
towards the theoretical formulation of the idea of the sovereign territorial state. Whilst I
focus mainly on the writing of a particular thinker, namely Baldus De Ubaldis, I also
consider the significance of another competing juristic approach, that of the Neopolitans. I
begin by demonstrating the manner in which Baldus's political thought constitutes an
3
acceptance of the universal claims of sovereignty of the emperor and pope as the basic
starting point, and from which he develops his argument for the sovereign territorial state. I
then examine Baldus' s use of the distinction between de iure and de facto recognitions of
sovereignty as a means ofjustifying territorial sovereignty in a larger conceptual
understanding of the hierarchy of sovereignty. I also explore the nature of this conception of
de facto sovereignty of the territorial city-state by elaborating on Baldus' s notion of the role
of consent and the non-recognition of a superior through his use of the ius gentium argument.
Finally, I explore how Baldus applies corporation theory to the idea of the defacto
territorially sovereign state in order to create an abstract entity which exists for a purely legal
purpose.
In Chapter Two, I investigate the notion of state territorial sovereignty in the writings of
Marsilius ofPadua. Before identifying all major stages of Marsilius's argument of
sovereignty, I first consider the viability of the claim that Marsilius's notion of sovereignty is
indeed territorially anchored. I then explore the nature of Marsilius' s arguments located
mainly in Discourses I of Defensor Pacis (Defender ofPeace), to argue that a notion of state
territorial sovereignty as that which belongs to only one supreme political authority, the
universitas civium (corporation ofcitizens), is once again evident in the theories of
fourteenth century political thought. Furthermore, I frequently bring to light the influence of
Aristotelian philosophy on Marsilius's thought and the impact it had on his scholastic
insights.
The needfor such an analysis?
The modern state as we currently understand it in nonnative political theory has been a
subject of thorough dissection and analysis on both a theoretical and conceptual level. As
Skinner(l989:90) suggests, since the time Hobbes undertook his search into the rights of
states and the duties of subjects, the idea that the state 'furnishes the central topic of
political theory has come to be universally accepted'. A tradition such as this, firstly,
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means that an attempt to delve into any specific area of the state is by most standards
intellectually relevant. In this way, this project is focused on analysing one of the key
features of the modem state: the fact that its jurisdiction and function is always bounded
within a particular sovereign territory.
Secondly, many contemporary political thinkers argue that geographic borders and the
issue of territorial sovereignty are critical to the definition of the state merely because they
are 'overwhelmingly convenient'. Thus, their 'inclusion in the definition of the state can
pass unchallenged' (Geuss:2001 :19). This research hopes to challenge this notion, as it
seeks to investigate where the conceptual basis for territorial sovereignty can be found.
Thirdly, in recent times there has been significant research on this critical subject of the
state, with a burgeoning literature that is preoccupied with trying to conceive of what lies
beyond the territorially sovereign state. Such a preoccupation firstly stems from an
intellectual and analytical demand to think beyond the conceptual framings that modem
political thought is so firmly rooted in vis-a-vis the state. Furthennore, such a
preoccupation has increasingly been marked by a more practical global concern that new
age technologies and advancements have made state borders redundant and on the retreat.
This has initiated the' globalisation debate', a subject that has become increasingly
fashionable in both political theory and international relations discourse in the last few
decades, as it attempts to deal with the 'changing nature and form', of the territorially
sovereign state (see Hirst & Thompson, 1996; Held et al ,1999).
The globalisation debate has heralded the use of a new modem political language that
analyses politics from the standpoint of the 'contemporary crisis of the nation state'. Hont
(1995: 166-170), provides a comprehensive historical perspective on this issue and
observes that there are 'two obvious dangers' threatening states, first that they cannot
'preserve their territorial integrity' and second, that 'they cannot provide the people within
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their territory with adequate welfare and comfort'. Hont makes an important point which
speaks directly to this particular thesis, when he argues the following:
To bring the 'political-territorial' problem of the viability of states into focus, one
needs to understand key aspects of the modem notion of popular sovereignty. I take it
as given that without a historically informed understanding of the theory of popular
sovereignty no clarification ofthe modem language of 'nation-states' and
'nationalism' is possible (Hont,1995: 171)
Hont's above argument, is relevant in two ways. Firstly, it echoes the importance of this
particular thesis, which is a study that provides some kind ofhistorical perspective to the idea
of state territorial sovereingty, in the contemporary context of globalisation. Secondly, it
allows for the contemporary political analyst of the state, to draw interesting parallels
between a historical perspective of terriorial sovereingty in the late medieval period and
territorial sovereignty as we know it today. These kind of parallels are already starting to
emerge in the writings of globalisation theorists such as Bull (cited in Held, 1999:86) who
argues for example, that globalisation can be regarded merely as a neo-medieval world order:
It is familiar that sovereign states today share the stage of world politics with 'other
actors' just as in medieval times the state had to share the stage with 'other
associations' ... If modem states were to come to share their authority over their
citizens, and their ability to command their loyalties, on the one hand with regional
and world authorities, and on the other hand with sub-state or sub-national authorities,
to such an extent that the concept of sovereingty ceased to be applicable, then a neo-
medieval form of universal political order might be said to have emerged.
Lastly many matters that concern and affect the lives of citizens of states are caused by
global problems and are thus only resolvable through international political solutions. A
good contemporary example of this is the degradation of the planetary environment.
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Methodology
This thesis is a philosophical and historical analysis that arises from a history of ideas
approach. In particular, it is concerned with examining a set of ideas and arguments on the
sovereign territorial state. These ideas are the human products of specific authors of political
theory, and belong to classic texts of political thought. In this way, Dunn (1996: 18) argues
that the methodological approach one would employ for political thought, would always be
guided by the significance of this understanding:
great texts of political theory, whether secular or devout, are essentially human
artefacts; products of concentrated intellectual labour and imaginative exploration by
palpably human agents.
As Dunn (1996: 19) points out the most appropriate methodological approach for the study of
political thought is the history of ideas method, most strongly associated with the
contemporary historian from the Cambridge School, Quentin Skinner. This method attempts
to analyse a group of primary texts, combined with some secondary and background textual
material, that will help reveal the essentially historical nature of the writings of classical
authors. One of its aims is to engage in a proper pursuit of intellectual history, by evaluating
the historical context first, so as to promote what Skinner describes as 'meaning and
understanding in the history of ideas' (2002:57-89).
By employing the objectives of the history of ideas method, this thesis promotes an
understanding of the roots ofmodem political thought and its classic authors in their
contexts. It argues that any meaningful engagement with the history of ideas must explore
the social conditions and historical contexts out of which they arose. This is because the
'historical character of texts are fundamental' and the 'key to understanding every such text'
(Dunn, 1996:19). Thus, it is vital that the reader focus on the 'preoccupations and purposes'
behind the writing of the classic text, even if it means stringently questioning what 'led the
author to compose it at all' (Dunn, 1996: 19). In this way, the purpose of this thesis is not to
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simply delve into the philosophical arguments of Baldus and Marsilius, that is, dealing with
their arguments in the purely philosophical spirit, with no account of their essentially
historical nature. Instead, as Skinner argues it is an attempt to situate these texts into their
particular historical contexts:
If we want a history of philosophy written in a genuinely historical spirit, we need to
make it one of our principal tasks to situate the texts we study within such intellectual
contexts as enable us to make sense of what their authors were doing in writing
them ...not of course to enter into the thought-processes of long-dead thinkers; it is
simply to use the ordinary techniques of historical enquiry to grasp their concepts, to
follow their distinctions, to appreciate their beliefs and, so far as possible, to see
things their way (2002:3).
As a way of making this explanation clearer, Skinner's argument seeks to address the
problematic nature of the way in which the history of ideas method has been traditionally
approached. He thus rejects the dominant method of studying and interpreting classic texts as
simply a set of ideas that contain'dateless wisdom', 'timeless elements', and 'universal'
principles (Skinner, 2002:57). These claims purported by readers, academics and students of
political thought have assumed continuing appeal in many sectors although they are
objectionable and misguided for the study of political thought, and is exactly what my study
tries to refrain from. As Skinner argues:
the belief that classical theorists can be expected to comment on a determinant set of
fundamental concepts has given rise, it seems to me, to a series of confusions and
exegetical absurdities that have bedevilled the history of ideas for too long (2002,57-
58).
Skinner attempts to deal with why limiting the history of ideas to a simple study of a given
classical text may lead to confusions and absurdities. The first dilemma with this is the fact
that it is simply impossible to separate one's own pre-judgements and pre-conceived notions
about what these texts might actually mean. What is likely to occur as a result ofthis,
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Skinner argues, is that these preconceptions will affect our ability to be true to these texts, as
they may act as determining factors of what we think and perceive (Skinner, 2002:58).
The obvious danger with this approach to the history of ideas is that it will not be correct to
assume what a certain historical text is supposed to mean in terms of our categories of
understanding. This is because we might often presume that a thinker in his account really
meant something that they might not have meant at all. This 'unconscious application of
paradigms' to historical texts may often lead the reader to construct an account that in all
likelihood would produce 'mythologies' rather than a history of thought (Skinner, 2002: 59).
Skinner highlights the forms in which these mythologies might manifest themselves. The
most common of these, he argues, is when an intellectual historian, whether in the field of
moral or political theory, articulates some doctrine on every topic 'constitutive of the subject'
(Skinner, 2002:59). What prevails from such a phenomenon are two distinct types of
intellectual histories, both of which are equally historically absurd:
One is more characteristic of intellectual biographies and synoptic histories of
thought, in which the focus is on the individual thinkers. The other is more
characteristic of 'histories of ideas' in which the special focus is on the development
of some 'unit idea' itself (Skinner, 2002: 60).
In both these instances what needs to be especially avoided are the dangers of anachronism.
The problem with anachronism being that a writer like Baldus or Marsilius may be
discovered by myself 'to have held a view, on the strength of some chance similarity of
terminology, about an argument to which they cannot in principle have meant to contribute'
(Skinner, 2002:60). In this thesis the temptation of being anachronistic was routinely
avoided. For example, I will note at the outset that trying to extract a modern day
understanding of the 'state' from the writings of the late medieval period is not the intention
of this thesis. Drawing from Black's (1992:186) useful discussion on this issue I argue that to
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understand the medieval idea of the state, is to first scrutinise the definitions we employ in
our understanding of the modern state.
Some of the definitions which Black (1992: 186) considers are: authority exercised over a
defined territory and all its inhabitants or the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical
coercion (as Weber put it). Black (1992:186) argues that the idea of the state in these senses
was present or developing in this period. Thus a theory of the state in the medieval period all
depends on 'how rigorous one wishes to be in applying the term' (Canning, 1988:350).
Furthermore, although states in their strictly modern form did not emerge in the political
thought during this period, there is certainly room for the view that some kind of 'state' did
exist, both in fact and in idea during this period (Burns, 1996:2). As Skinner (1989:91)
argues, as 'early as the fourteenth century the Latin term status- together with such
vernacular equivalents as status, regis, civitas and state- can already be found in general use
in a variety of political contexts'. It is clear that the meaning of the state was conveyed by
this range of terms, although not fully abstracted as we know it in the modem sense. What is
more important is that these usages common throughout late-Medieval Europe eventually
gave rise to 'recognisably modern discussions of the concept of the state' (Skinner 1989:95).
It is the idea of state territorial sovereignty found in the captivating accounts of late medieval
scholars that is foremost to this enquiry. This thesis uses the history of ideas method to
analyse the illuminating accounts of Baldus and Marsilius, in their conceptualisations of the
territorially sovereign state in the late Middle Ages. It achieves this by constantly locating
the ideas of the historical texts it utilises (such as the Defender ofPeace) into their
appropriate historical context. It therefore attempts to provide an account not only of the
meaning of what was said in the texts at hand, but also of that which the writer of the texts
may have meant by what was said. The reason for this, as Skinner suggests, is that the
understanding of texts, 'presupposes the grasp of what they were intended to mean and of
how that meaning was intended to be taken (2002:86).' Simply, when dealing with a given
text, the question this thesis asks first, is what the authors, who wrote at the time for the
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specific audience they had in mind, could in a practical sense have intended to communicate
in their textual pronouncements? This, as Skinner correctly points out, is the most
constructive way of dealing with political ideas:
It seems to me, therefore, that the most illuminating way of proceeding must be to
begin by trying to delineate the full range of communications that could have been
conventionally performed on the given occasion by the issuing ofthe given utterance.
After this, the next step must be to trace the relations between the given utterance and
this wider linguistic context as a means of decoding the intentions of the given writer
(2002,87).
In this way the focus of study is undeniably a linguistic one, and the appropriate direction of
this methodology is then to concern itself with retrieving the possible intentions of the writer
of the historical text. This can only be achieved if we examine the social or historical context
of the given author, as a way of assessing what linguistic meanings may have been conveyed:
The social context figures as the ultimate framework for helping to decide what
conventionally recognisable meanings it might in principle have been possible for
someone to have intended to convey (Skinner, 2002:87).
Adhering to these methodological principles was critical in my enquiry. Throughout this
study I have provided an initial examination of the intellectual and physical contexts of the
texts I analyse, before turning to the meanings I derive in my accompanying analyses, all the
while cognisant of the impact of the medieval context. For example, the political, legal and
religious realities of fourteenth century medieval Europe are ever-present in my
understanding of the ideas conveyed by both Baldus and Marsilius. Hence I subscribe fully
to the view that Baldus' political conceptions, for example, 'only surrender their historical
meaning, if the reader bears in mind the particular institution, entities, and relationships with
which the jurist was actually concerned' (Canning, 1987:2). Thus what is evident is the
'dialogue between philosophical analysis and historical evidence' (Skinner, 2002:87).
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The history of ideas methodology does not flagrantly discount the philosophical importance
of the ideas in classic texts. It simply argues that as intellectual historians we must be vigilant
in our approach so as not to assume that classic texts are directly concerned with the current
day predicament. As Skinner argues, informed by this sort of reasoning we are sure to see
that:
Classic texts, especially in moral, social and political theory, can help us reveal, not
the essential sameness, but rather the variety of viable moral assumptions and
political commitments. It is here that there philosophical, even moral, value may be
said to lie (Skinner,2006:88).
Furthennore, we should not assume that using the present context as a vantage point in our
treatment of the history of ideas is necessarily the most effective method of dealing with
political thought:
There is a tendency to suppose that the best, and merely the inescapable, vantage
point from which to survey the ideas of the past must be that of our present situation,
because it is by definition the most highly evolved. Such a claim cannot survive
recognition of the fact that historical differences over fundamental issues may reflect
differences of intention and convention rather than anything like a completion over a
community of values, let alone anything like an evolving perception of the Absolute
(Skinner, 2002:88).
In essence then, the aim of this research is therefore to meaningfully engage with a set of
primary texts, by returning them to the precise contexts in which they were initially formed.
It is thus to engage in a kind of study that is more complicated and reflexive, historically and
philosophically. Furthermore, it is to discover from a methodology like the history of ideas
that there have been a myriad of ideas and concepts which have belonged to the various
societies of the past, and from this we are to discover a general truth not only about the past
but also about ourselves (Skinner, 2002:89).
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The modem understanding of the political significance of territorial sovereignty, in
relation to the state, if examined within the overriding framework of the history of
political ideas, can be described as a 'direct heir or descendent' of both the
political thought and historical circumstances of the Medieval Period (Ullmann,
1965:7).
Of the former I refer specifically to the collection of various discourses arising
from sectors unique to medieval society, which have helped shape and transform
the institutions and political ideas that we know today. This chapter is thus
preoccupied with examining one aspect of this diverse discourse, namely the
contributions ofjuristic writing that deal with the emergence of the territorial state
from the period after the mid-1 t h century. Whilst it focuses mainly on the writings
of a particular thinker, namely Baldus De Ubaldis, it also considers the
significance of another competing juristic approach, that being the Neopolitans.
However, of the latter, that is, the historical circumstances of the medieval period,
I particularly note that the series of moments that make up the historical process
necessarily condition the political ideas that emerge from that context. Simply,
what this suggests is that the specific historical setting in which the thinkers of the
medieval era wrote contributed directly to the formulation of their political views.
It is incumbent, then, that any attempt to locate the juristic ideas of both state and
territory during the late medieval period must first be accompanied by a discussion
of the historical context that precipitated those ideas. In a sense this inadvertently
acknowledges that the complicated developments of medieval society are mirrored
in various unique outcomes, one of which is its political thought. As Skinner
(2002:57) amongst others has pointed out, making sense of the historical context is
part of a process of deriving 'meaning and understanding' from the history of
ideas.
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What then can we describe as the main historical developments that led to the
emergence of a plurality of sovereign territorial states in the fourteenth century?
How are we to trace the manner in which territorial states came into being? Note
that I say this with a certain degree of circumspection, as the medieval historical
process is never as straightforward as we want it to be. As I shall uncover below,
the nature of medieval society, and the manner in which it is bound to a
complexity of religious, social, political and historical forces, means that the
medieval historical landscape is often ambiguous and varied. Take for example the
many competing and often complicating structures of authorities that exist in the
medieval set-up: emperor, pope, king, bishop, vassal etc. In this regard, many
historians emphasise that medieval society is 'far from static' (Power, 2006:3).
This is not to say, however, that certain key developments and events that shape
the medieval historical landscape are not to be found.
What then are some of the key factors and events that occur during the loth to the
12th centuries, which help facilitate the historical fact of independent territorial
entities such as city-states and kingdoms, which as we shall discover in this
discussion, are deemed sovereign within their defined borders? My aim here is
not to inundate the reader with a detailed account of all historical events that span
over these three centuries, but rather to create some sense of a background, as it
were, to the way in which the territorial state came into being.
An 'empire anachronistic'
In around the year 800, the Frankish King Charles the Great, commonly known as
Charlemagne, was anointed and crowned emperor by the pope. In many ways
Charlemagne was seen to be the heir of the Roman emperor, an imperial title that
was to epitomise the unification of Latin Christendom and facilitate the
establishment of the Carolingian empire. Factually, the empire was a 'great
multiracial state', whose territories extended across all of Western Europe,
excluding the British Isles (Caenegem, I988: 174). In a sense, for many, it was the
rebirth of Rome. What had been described as 'the normal ordo', or the great ideal
of the old order of the Roman Empire had been restored, and a much-needed
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unification of Westem Europe was once again taking place (Caenegem, 1988: 175).
All people belonged under the 'aegis of one monarchy and one church'
(Caenegem,1988: 175).
However, this stability did not last long. The great dreams of social and religious
unification through the empire began to look like a false reality. Already by the
ninth century, the lands of the empire were subject to territorial portioning. This
division took place steadily, as members of the Carolingian dynasty each claimed
a part for themselves. This particular moment in history, which saw the division of
the Carolingian empire into kingdoms like France, is what laid the foundation for
the 'territorial distribution of the various powers in that part of Europe, for more
than a thousand years' (Gottmann,1973: 30).
Nevertheless, the political ramifications of this break-up are to be seen on another
level also. In around the tenth century, there is a 'second phase of disintegration',
which sees the further division of each kingdom into a number of regional political
entities, commonly referred to as 'territorial principalities' (Caenegem,1988: 175).
Political authority is unwillingly transferred from the king to economically
powerful families. Founded by royal officials, these principalities undermine the
crown by taking 'power into their own hands' (Caenegem,1988:l75). This
process of fragmentation within the kingdom is a distinctly medieval political
phenomenon.
But it was not to stop there. By the eleventh century, several of these territorial
principalities, were divided once again into 'tiny castellanies', which consisted of
small, autonomous political units, 'with a castle at its centre' and protected by
knights all around (Caenegem, 1988: 176). This type of independent local power
facilitated the first phase of feudalism, a kind of economic production,
characterised by vassalage, the 'personal bond between one man and another'
(Coleman, 1999: 13). Indeed this was only to further decentralise political authority
and jurisdiction.
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Many argue that the main reason for this oveli decentralisation of power was the
'weakness ofthe crown' (Caenegem, 1988: 176). Simply, large kingdoms could no
longer guarantee the safety of their subjects against foreign invaders. Protection
was thus sought in 'the leadership of powerful local figures' (Caenegem,
1988:176). Consequently, this fragmentation, first of the empire, and then of the
kingdom, heralded a decline in the exercise of the political authority of the state
and its organs.
Furthermore, it is suggested that the disintegration of a great state, like the
Carolingian empire, 'can naturally be expected to lead to a loss of quality in the
public service' (Caenegem,1988: 178). To say this is an understatement. In the
early eleventh century, there is a clear breakdown of all previously functioning
spheres of government. Public order had reached an abysmal low and constant
warfare ensued. Political fragmentation had meant that 'all who boasted a castle of
their own behaved as they liked and recognised no power above them' (Caenegem,
1988: 180). The ruin of the empire, and its political authority in particular, was
prevalent, and these v.arying degrees of anarchy were accompanied by a sustained
wish for some type of order.
A desire for order, reinstating the state
By the middle of the eleventh century, a general disillusionment with the existing
political condition was recognised, and a need for change became imminent. Thus
in the period of the eleventh century, an 'opposite movement' was underway
throughout Europe, that aimed at both 'strengthening the monarchy and the role of
government' (Caenegem,1988:185). The geographical extent of this movement
was especially extensive, targeting all politically fragmented sectors of society
under larger and more stable governments or states. Some were incorporated into
national or regional kingdoms or counties, but whatever the system, it no longer
meant that the internal structure of these governments was fraught by division. Let
me note that when I speak of the' state', I do not refer to it in its modem sense. As
Canning suggests, there is a 'usefulness in employing the term 'state', in an
16
analysis of medieval political organisation, as long as the limitations involved in
this usage are recognised' (1988:350). I
The principal reason for the revival ofmonarchic states was a 'deep-seated
revulsion against the lawlessness and oppression' that was encountered during that
time (Caenegem, 1988: 187). The series of events in the eleventh century had
contributed to undermining the social and political authority that was previously
present. A return to monarchic rule via the state apparatus was envisaged as a
possible means of achieving the required stability. Indeed, the institutional
arrangement of the state was reinstated mainly to remedy the damage that had
already been done.
Such a point is particularly significant for this discussion, and in many ways runs a
thread throughout this project, as it seeks to question the link between territory and
security. It can be argued that the concept of territoriality connotes a certain
reasonableness of human communities in their acceptance of geographical
limitation for certain purposes, the foremost of which has been security. Whenever
safety becomes questionable, as we have seen in the events of eleventh century
medieval Europe, the demand for more effective political organisation on an
institutional level becomes a priority. Ordinary citizens expect the creation of a
more secure society from the political authorities in question. This is coupled with
a greater emphasis on delineation of frontiers and borders, as the size of the
territory is considered to ensure greater security. As in the case mentioned above, a
process of rebuilding states and redefining territories was implemented to rectify
the problem of the lack of security.
The role 0.[feudalism
By the end of the eleventh century the impact of feudalism was well pronounced
in medieval society. It is important to highlight this, as the relationship of
1 Here I refer to the detailed discussion in the main introduction of the thesis on anachronism and thelimitations involved in the usage ofthe term state in the medieval period.
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medieval state formation and that of feudalism can never be underestimated. In
short, feudalism was a distinct economic arrangement that revolved around a
'hierarchy of ruling classes who distributed land to subordinates in return for
various rents and services' (Glassner & Fahrer, 2004:52). Now, with the re-
establishment of centralised authority in the late eleventh century, feudal practices
were played out differently. This is referred to by some as the 'second feudal age'
(see Coleman, 1999: 14-15) and it saw kings using the existing structures of
feudalism to serve their own ends. Simply, kings who employed existing feudal
practices appeared to enjoy for themselves various services and revenues. This
became further entrenched when kings restructured feudalism according to various
orders of medieval society: 'clergy, nobility and labouring men' (Coleman,
1999: 15).
It has thus been argued that feudal practices aided rather than impeded state
formation. This is because feudal practices enhanced the 'centralizing strategies of
kings' by providing them with a 'recovered monopoly over financial means and
royal justice' (Coleman, 1999: 15). More importantly, feudalism offered a typically
hierarchical construction of power. This meant that kings could now use feudalism
to further legitimate their political authority (Coleman, 1999: 15). Thus, with
political development and change, the practices of feudalism would lurk in the
background.
Rediscovering Roman Law in the Twelflh-CentUlY
Twelfth-century medieval Europe, often described as the 'twelfth century
renaissance', is highly interesting on many fronts. Historically, it is considered a
period of progress, in which new ideas were advanced and the pursuit of
intellectual knowledge was pursued with a renewed vigour. In this regard, the
acquisition and study of Aristotle's writings on natural philosophy were very
significant, and would transform the general intellectual climate and illuminate
previously inflexible doctrines of learning. For our purposes, however, there are
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two reasons for the importance of the twelfth century, which I believe relate
specifically to this discussion.
The first of these is the 'self-conscious' and comprehensive revival of Roman law
in the twelfth century, approximately five hundred years after its initial
compilation (Stein, 1999:43). As early as the sixth century, the Roman emperor
Justinian had codified a collection ofjuristic texts on legal issues, referred to as the
COlpUS iuris civilis. The significance of these documents can hardly be
exaggerated. As the reader is to discover later in this discussion, the corpus iuris
civilis occupied an important place in Medieval Europe not only as a source of
rules, but also as a wellspring of intellectual and juristic debate. A culture of
juristic excellence was to be formed after the revival of Roman law, as the
practical application of Roman law to the changing political and social
environment, initiated new and exciting intellectual debates.
Subject to this development, I identify the second reason for the importance of the
twelfth century. With the revival of Roman law, the ruler of the time, Frederick
Barabossa, declared new appeal to the ideas of the universal empire, based on the
teachings of the COlpUS. Simply, Roman law, enabled Barabossa to 'play the role
ofa new Justinian, God's deputy as a universal law-giver and peace-maker, ruler
of the holy empire' (Nelson, 1988: 249). Such a claim for universal emperorship
found an effective ally in the COlpUS iuris civilis, where a universalist conception
of Roman imperial lordship was to be found. This meant that since Roman law
enjoyed a universal acceptability within Latin Christendom, such claims for
political authority were more difficult to challenge.
Moreover, at the same time a second claim for universal power in the continent
was emerging from papal circles. However, this claim was evidently repealed by
the Emperor Barabossa, who declared himself the only true 'dominus mundi' (lord
of the world), and rejected vehemently all claims of 'secular authority' by the
papacy. This began a series of imperial-papal conflicts, which would play
themselves out during the period of the 1t h to 15th centuries, as the quest for
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ultimate territorial domination between the empire and papacy ensued. These
claims are particularly important, as they became sites of scholastic interrogation
and analysis and, as I shall highlight, preoccupy much of the political thought
concerning the development of the state.
City-states and kingdoms
By the thirteenth century, in conjunction with the empire, two major examples of
independent territorial state development were clearly evident in medieval Europe:
city-states and monarchies. As noted earlier, I do not refer to the 'state' as it is
known in its strictly modem sense. What can be discerned, however, is the
'emergence of politically organised communities with specific and defined
territories within which the internal and external sovereignty of rulers of
governments were developed' (Canning,1988:350). But what exactly made these
territorial entities independent and sovereign in practical terms?
The answer lies in the contemporary reality of the absence of the emperor in
directing effective political authority over all the territories in his dominion. It is
the lack of direct involvement by the emperor in the affairs and interests of all his
territories, which created the room for territorial independence in many areas of
Western Medieval Europe. In actuality these cities and monarchies functioned
without any imperial jurisdiction, and therefore resorted to their own political
devices: such as popular-rule of government and the establishing of law-making
through the process of consent, within their jurisdictionally bounded territories.
The 'existing bond of faith' between the emperor and his subjects was said to be
'broken on both sides', with the emperor being 'absent and impotent' and
territorial entities such as cities becoming 'disobedient' (Canning,1987:115).
Hence, we are able to see a clear shift in the ordering of medieval political
authority, with the emperor emerging more as a redundant figurehead over many
areas of Latin Europe, where there is evidence of the emergence of a plurality of
sovereign states. The case of city-states in north and central Italy, like Florence
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and Lucca, are good historical examples of cities with small-scale governments
and civic independence that were able to demand genuine sovereignty. Similarly,
national kingdoms such as France successfully consolidated their monarchies in
the thirteenth century, producing another case for territorial sovereignty.
A turning point in thirteenth andfourteenth century political thought
These examples of independent state development presented a unique opportunity
for innovation within the realm of political thought. In a sense, it meant that
although claims for universal sovereignty of the empire were ever-present, not
accommodating the sovereign territorial state within the greater intellectual
discourse would reflect a disregard of the facts of the contemporary political
reality. However, an understanding of territorial statehood and sovereignty in
conceptual terms would be subject to first solving the technicalities of Roman law
claims of universal sovereignty by the emperor. This is because the acceptance of
the universal sovereignty of the emperor would be denying any true external
sovereignty of these territorial states, since sovereignty is fundamental to any
concept of the state.
The Commentators
Indeed it was to be the Commentators of the thirteenth and fourteenth century that
made one of the most 'distinctive contributions' to the theoretical understanding of
the state through the texts of Roman law (Canning, 1982: 1). Their writing was
primarily centred on the practical intention of accommodating legal science to the
prevailing contemporary historical reality. Complex juristic language accompanied
their conceptual discussions on all issues of practical importance. These
contributions are thus found in systematic and extensive commentaries on
problems relevant to their context. Moreover, the Commentators believed that
jurisprudence had a profound relevance, as it was concerned with human affairs:
Every art takes nature for its material ... but the jurist takes the works of
man for his material. ..Again, he interprets them; and thus our law is
founded upon accidentals, that is on cases which emerge... for laws are
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born of facts ...But the common material [oflegal science] is not concerned
with the works of nature but of man (Baldus [1498] cited in
Canning,1987:6).2
For the Commentators, then, the legal science was essentially 'this-worldly', and
thus the study of Roman law and its application into new contexts would help
illuminate their understanding of the changing conditions of human society. This
is best reflected in the substantial number of legal opinions (consilia) which they
wrote, as responses to new questions and ideas which were of relevance to their
context.
Within the juristic and technical language of their writing, political ideas and
arguments are an ever-emerging subject of discussion. However it must be said
that these writers did not set out to establish a particular discourse of political
theory. Instead, as is rightfully suggested, the Commentators 'developed a
recognition of political facts which amounted to a political dimension of
discourse'(Canning, 1982:3).
Sources of Ideas
Before we are to delve into the discussion surrounding the two main threads of
argument expressed by the Commentators, it is worth revisiting two key
developments mentioned above, that were important sources for ideas, which
informed and contributed to the views expressed by this group. The first is the
influence of Aristotelian philosophy, which for the first time allowed thinkers of
the Middle Ages to view the concept of the state in a 'this-worldly' dimension.
Aristotelian thought made it possible to think of the state as existing for its own
political ends, separate from all that which medieval thinkers commonly
associated with it. Furthermore the language of the Commentators denoted a
logical framework that was noticeably Aristotelian, as they 'employed Aristotelian
logical categories and forms of argument' (Canning,1982: 3).
2All primary sources of the thinker Baldus De Ubaldis are rare unpublished manuscripts, which wereunavailable to me. I have thus accessed them through a secondary source, that being, the books andarticles of his greatest commentator, Joseph Canning.
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The second source is the Corpus Iuris Civilis, or texts of Roman Law, which
enjoyed a great amount of social, cultural and religious significance after its
restoration and revival in medieval society after the twelfth century. The co/pus
iuris civilis had a direct impact on political thought as it 'provided an articulated
language for the public dimension of human activity necessary for the concept of
political life' (Canning, 1982:2). Medieval jurists were thus able to extract from the
principles of Roman law to formulate their responses on contemporary matters.
Dealing with the idea of the territorial state is one example of this, with jurists able
to create a theory of the territorial state 'whose points of reference were very
clearly rooted in this world' (Canning,1982:2).
Two Approaches in the Roman Law Commentator Tradition
It is well documented that amongst the Commentators, two clear approaches are
presented as 'forms of solution', or juristic explanations to the issue of territorial
states (see Canning 1982, 1987). I will examine both these juristic explanations, so
as to provide the reader with a general account of the manner in which ideas of the
territorial state were expounded upon. Beyond this, I particularly wish for the
reader to observe how two radically opposing views arise from the same point of
departure. This said, my main point of focus is the discussion around the second
group of Commentators, known as the French and Italian Commentators, and
around the writings of one thinker in particular, namely Baldus de Ubaldis. My
reasons for doing this are arguably of some importance and will probably be best
understood at the end of this discussion, when the main thrusts of both the
arguments have been unfolded. However, for purposes of explicating my intent to
the reader, I will argue that the second group of Commentators are more
interesting analytically, as they develop a deeper and more complex set of
arguments whilst retaining their existing framework.
To demonstrate this, I begin by approaching both groups of Commentators
through what is factually their most fundamental problem, and which might
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preclude them from formulating 'any concept of the territorial state at all'
(Canning,1982:3). Essentially, the difficulty for the Commentators in finding a
solution for the sovereignty of the territorial state hinges on the express statements
within the texts of Roman law, that true universal sovereignty is invested in the
emperor. The emperor, who is declared dominus mundi (lord of the world), is thus
accorded undeniable political authority.
The all-encompassing nature of Roman Law and its application to medieval
society meant that the Commentators were required to factor this in, if they were
to account juristically for any other form of sovereign power. The acceptance of
this universal claim would mean something even deeper for the analytical
conception of the state. It would simply deny external sovereignty to territorial
city-states and kingdoms, and thus render them devoid of any real statehood
(Canning, 1982: 4). Hence any analytical or practical innovation of the political
would first need to negotiate the matter of universal sovereignty of the empire.
When addressing the idea of sovereignty in relation to territorial city-states and
kingdoms, the Commentators sought solutions to this fundamental problem in
different ways. Indeed, it was to be a point ofjuristic divergence with two distinct
types of solution emerging, both attempting juristically to justify the territorial
state.
The Neapolitans
The first group of thinkers known as the Neopolitan jurists are of major relevance
to medieval political thought. Its main proponents are the Italian civilian writers of
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries such as Marinus de Caramanico, Andreas
de Isernia and Oldaradus of Ponte. Their views can be described as both radical
and polemical, especially if examined within the context in which they were
written. The Neopolitan stance is exemplified in a highly charged rejection of the
claim of universal sovereignty of the emperor. Instead, it views 'independent
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kingdoms as existing on the same basis as the territorially restricted empire'
(Canning,1987: 4).
Whilst the Neopolitan argument might be theoretical in nature, it is centred on a
more practical concern, that being the manner in which the King of Sicily may
acquire complete sovereign independence from the Roman emperor. This however
does not detract from its greater and more far-reaching application, 'suitable for
any independent monarchy' (Canning,1982:5). Although the Neopolitan argument
can be understood and contextualised in a myriad of ways, its greatest relevance to
our enquiry (of territorially sovereign statehood) is through its usage of the ius
gentium argument. However, before we delve into the complexities and merits of
this ius gentium argument it might perhaps be worthwhile unpacking the notion of
what the ius gentium actually is.
According to the principles of Roman law, a distinction could be drawn between
the many kinds of laws that exist within Roman law texts. The most profound
distinction is that the law can be embodied in three well-defined categories. The
first of these is ius naturale or the natural law; the second is ius civile, which is the
law of a particular community, like the Romans; and the third is the ius gentium,
which is the law common to all people.
For our purposes, it is best to understand the ius gentium in two main senses. The
first is to view it in its purely 'practical' sense, in that one can define the ius
gentium as that part of Roman private law, which is open to all, 'citizens and non-
citizens alike' (Hornblower & Spawforth,1996:790). The second sense is a more
'theoretical' one, and states that the ius gentium is associated with the
philosophical construct of the law of nature (ius naturale). This is because it is a
law that is 'observed by all nations' ,and this element of its universality means that
it is grounded in 'natural reason, which is established amongst all mankind'
(Hornblower & Spawforth 1996:790). In this regard, one of the most striking
features of the ius gentium as understood by the Roman law jurists is the fact that
it is governed by natural reason (naturalis ratio).
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The question that arises then is how exactly did the Neopolitan jurists use the ius
gentium argument to deny the universal sovereignty of the empire, and to justify
the territorial sovereignty of kingdoms? Simply how were they able to justify that
kingdoms derive their independent existence from the ius gentium (Canning 1982:
5)? The Neopolitan ius gentium argument is grounded in several key points,
which although individually expressed by its most noteworthy writers, all confer
the same meaning. Below I will attempt to demonstrate logically the rationale of
these arguments, so as to provide the reader with a general understanding of their
content and meaning.
The starting point for the Neopolitan argument is a scrutiny of the historical basis
for the claim of the universal sovereignty of the emperor. Oldaradus in his
emphatic treatise Consilium, 69, argues that the de iure (lord of the world) claim
of the emperor over independent kingdoms is fundamentally undermined if one
considers the fact that the kingdoms derive their de iure independence, or
sovereignty, from the ius gentium, which precedes the Roman empire in time.
According to Oldaradus, claims of universal sovereignty of the empire are based
on the Roman civil law (ius civile), a product of the Roman empire itself, thus
having less significance then the ius gentium, which is a natural law founded on
human reason, and which has intrinsically evolved with human society:
From the primeval law of nature there are neither kingdoms nor an
empire... From the ius gentium which is also called natural.. .from this law
dominions are made distinct through occupation and kingdoms founded
(0.1.1.5). And thus, since kings exist from this law, and emperors only
existed from civil law, that is through the Roman people, kings, as will be
made clear below, possess a juster title, since it remains firm and
immutable forever by a form of natural law which was set up by divine
providence (Oldaradus [Lyon, 1550] cited in Canning,1982:6).
From this perspective, then, kingdoms have a greater right to assert their sovereign
independence than the 'emperor has to his empire' (Canning,1982:5). This
explanation of the historical nature of the ius gentium appears in the writing of
other Neopolitan thinkers such as Marinus who similarly argues:
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long before the empire and the Roman race from of old, that is from the ius
gentium which emerged from the human race itself, kingdoms were
recognised and founded (Marinus de Caramanico [Milan: 1597] cited in
Canning,1982: 5)
The Neopolitan ius gentium argument is then developed into a second stage, which
deals with the manner in which kingdoms and empires can exist as separate
territorial entities in the political world. For this, the Neopolitan thinkers turn to an
already established Roman law concept known as 'rex qui superiorem non
recognoscit' (a king who does not recognise a superior) and extend it further by
applying the notion of rex in regno suo est imperator regni sui (a king in his
territory is commander of his own kingdom). The argument holds that based on
the idea of rex in regno suo est imperator regni sui, kings within their territory
possess the identical power ofjurisdiction that the 'emperor possesses in the
empire as a whole' (Canning,1982: 6). Simply, this meant that the claim of
universal sovereignty of the emperor is denied and replaced with a more practical
solution of the emperor retaining sovereignty and political authority over
territories in which he can employ genuine political authority. In addition,
kingdoms are to function as separate sovereign territorial bodies at the same time.
It would therefore be the ius gentium then that would provide this 'legal title for
monarchies' (Canning,1987:69).
Marinus applies this to the context of the Kingdom of Sicily and concludes that the
king of Sicily may lawfully claim within his kingdom, 'all the legal rights and
powers' which the leader (princeps) enjoys in Roman law, on the basis that
Roman law has 'validity in Sicily' (Canning, 1987:6). An obvious counter-reply to
this, however, would be that if the universal sovereignty of the emperor is declared
invalid, why should Roman law assume any validity in Sicily? Marinus's reply is
one in favour of maintaining the kingdom's integrity. He believes that Roman law
has validity in Sicily, 'because it was accepted by the custom of the kingdom'
(Canning,1982:6).
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The conceptual outcome of this reasoning is that the political sphere consists of a
multitude of territorially sovereign kingdoms, and the empire is just one territorial
entity among many. Andreas expounds this image of the distinction ofmonarchic
and imperial power. Continuing in the line of the Neopolitan position, he argues
that the king has the same power in his kingdom as the emperor has in the empire,
and that they should both be distinguished as the same form of territorial body. He
does however make a radical statement when he declares that this solution ensures
that the world is restored to its true and pristine condition much like the world
before the conquests of Rome:
With cause another king will be able to do in his kingdom what the
emperor can in the land of the empire, which is small these days. In Italy he
possesses only Lombardy, and not all of that, and part of Tuscany; the rest
belongs to the Church of Rome, like the kingdom of Sicily also. The
provinces therefore (which have a king) have returned to the pristine form
of having kings, which is easily done. Free kings have as much in their
kingdoms as the emperor in the empire (Andreas de Isernia [Lyon: 1550]
cited in Canning, 1982: 6).
The above demonstration of the Neopolitan solution to the claim of universal
sovereignty of the emperor can be regarded as fascinating and innovative in two
significant ways. The first is in relation to the manner in which it attempts to
subvert a dominant juristic injunction embedded in Roman law, which for many
jurists and political thinkers operating in the realm of medieval society was a
conceptual given, namely the universal sovereignty of the emperor. The second,
which is foremost to this discussion as a whole, is the way it deals with the issue
of territorial sovereignty and the concept of the state. Here I make reference to the
suggestions of many contemporary medieval analysts (see Canning,1982 and
Ullmann,1965) that the Neopolitan rejection of universal sovereignty of the empire
indicates a clear movement towards the 'development of the idea of the territorial
state'. As demonstrated above, this is because the Neopolitan solution is based on
the ius gentium argument, which views the empire (those territories in which the
emperor exercises 'actual political power') and kingdoms as existing on the 'same
level', as they are manifestations of what are essentially different territorial states
(Canning,1987 :70).
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Why the Neopolitan jurists did not arrive at a fully worked out state concept is
open to debate, but in my view could most possibly lie in the peculiarities of the
medieval context itself. Take for example the issue of the territorial sovereignty of
Sicily. For most Neopolitan jurists, their real focus was centred on the 'territorial
sovereignty of the king, rather than of an entity such as the kingdom itself
(Canning, 1982: 7). In other words the preoccupation of the Neopolitan thinkers
was more concerned with the person of the king rather than the people that
constituted that kingdom. This difficulty in abstracting the state as an institutional
entity, I argue, is a result of the manner in which medieval society associated
political authority with the actual person of a figure like the king. 3 Nonetheless,
the Neopolitan solution is perhaps the most progressive within medieval political
thought, with regards to the conceptualisation of the issue of territorial sovereignty
and the state.
Baldus de Ubaldis and the secondjuristic solution
In what follows, I shall present what might be described as the other solution to
the problem of the claim of universal sovereignty of the emperor. Distinct in
structure and method to the Neopolitan argument, this second solution (in its
collective form) arises from the school of French and Italian Commentators, a
tradition of civil lawyers of note, such as Bartolus of Sassaferrato, Baldus de
Ubaldis, as well as Jacobus de Ravannis and Petrus de Bellapertica. However, as I
have stated earlier, I have chosen to direct my attention to the conceptual
arguments ofjust one of these thinkers, namely Baldus de Ubaldis, for two
reasons. Firstly, Baldus is undoubtedly one of the greatest contributors ofjuristic
writing to medieval political thought as a whole. He is for example posited as one
of the 'two most important Italian jurists of the fourteenth century' (the other
being his teacher Bartolus), and unanimously regarded as a 'major luminary' of
the Commentator school (Canning,1982:8). His legal opinions or consilia are the
3 An interesting discussion around the issue ofpolitical authority and the king in the Middle Ages, can
be found in Kantorowicz, 1957 The King's Two Bodies where the two personae of the king are traced
back to the medieval period.
It is Hobbes in the Leviathan who makes the most significant contribution to the modem idea of the
state, as he successfully abstracts the state from that to which it was commonly associated.
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largest number produced by any medieval jurist as he applies legal theory
extensively to the political condition in which he lived.4 Secondly, since the set of
arguments from the French and Italian school are a great deal more complex and
emblematic of their period in that they accommodate more of the complexities of
the medieval contextS, I believe it is best to approach them via the writings of a
single thinker.
A possible starting point for understanding Baldus's arguments (and for the other
commentators of his tradition) is to identify the 'fundamental structure which
underlies and informs' his arguments, that being 'the acceptance that universally
sovereign authorities, in the form of the emperor and the pope, coexist with
territorially sovereign entities, that is independent city-republics and kingdoms'
(Canning 1987:17). In other words, what comprises the basis of Baldus's political
thought is his exposition of the origin, nature, function and interrelation of two
distinct forms of sovereignty, the universal and territorial. This implies that
Baldus's solution would not reject the de iure claims ofuniversal sovereignty of
the empire and papacy, and instead resolve the demand for sovereignty of
independent territorial states through some other means. However, would this not
denote a contradiction of terms since one could easily argue that adhering to a
notion of universal sovereignty automatically excludes the possibility of the
recognition of a territorial entity such as a city? In short, are these 'two ideas
mutually exclusive' (Canning,1987: 17)?
Baldus does not seem to think so. Unlike the Neopolitan solution, Baldus and his
school of thinkers maintained the universal sovereignty of the emperor by
upholding the Roman law. Notice that the acceptance of a second claim of
universal sovereignty, that of the pope, is also established by Baldus. At this stage
I do not wish to explore this in any detail, except to say that Baldus recognised the
papal claim for universal sovereignty as legitimate in light of the texts of Roman
4 Canning (1987:7) notes that the 'sheer volume ofBaldus's juristic writing is prodigious (somewhat in
excess of seven million words)'.
5 Here, Canning for example argues that the intricacies and juristic detail employed by this school of
jurists renders them eligible for the 'prize for mental gymnastics'.
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law. Unlike the emperor, however, he does limit papal sovereignty to the spiritual
rather than the temporal, and as we shall see later in the discussion, he attempts to
consider papal authority at all stages of his argument, even in relation to territorial
states.
The Universal Claim ofthe Empire
For Baldus, then, the empire would serve as the basic point from which any theory
of territorial states would emerge. Naturally, this acceptance of the universal claim
of sovereignty of the emperor would pose a far greater challenge for Baldus, if he
sought to accommodate the sovereignty of other territorial bodies.But an
adherence to Roman law principles as the valid law of the empire meant that
jurists like Baldus would not question the rights of the emperor, as they deemed
them inherent to the co/pus itself: 'It is very true that the emperor is lord of the
world with respect to all kinds ofjurisdiction and supreme power' (Baldus
[Brescia:1490] cited in Canning,1987:24). Furthermore, emphasising the universal
rights of the empire meant that Baldus and his school of commentators were
'reflecting a legal reality in Italy which the study of Roman law had historically
helped to shape' (Canning,1987:24). Thus the demands of the historical context
sought not to question imperial jurisdiction but to recognise it as a living,
unquestionable reality.
Yet surely there must have been a 'deeper reason' behind Baldus's purposeful
stance in favour of the universal sovereignty of the emperor, above and beyond the
fact that it was a product of Roman law (Canning,1982:24)? What else did Baldus
ground his initial arguments on, in a way that sets him apart from the Neopolitans,
and initiated the long series ofjuristic treatises on political thought which he
wrote? The reason is actually quite simple given the religiously bound context out
of which he was emerging. Baldus held that the emperor was 'divinely instituted'
and because God himself bestowed this lofty status on the emperor, his authority
cannot be questioned:
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Note that we are all bound to the emperor because God, just as he is the
emperor in heaven, has also set up the emperor on earth as his vicar and
ruler in faith, truth and justice... Moreover sacred scripture says, "Let every
soul be subject to the emperor" (Baldus [Brescia: 1490] cited in Canning,
1987:25).
It is suggested that this tendency of according a 'theocratic origin to the power of
the emperor' is characteristic of mainstream juristic interpretation (Canning,
1987:25). Hence for a jurist like Baldus, it would be perfectly natural to refer to
the emperor as a representative of God on earth:
Note that everyone who takes an oath does not do so against the emperor,
just as he does not against God. And thus an exception is made of the
emperor in every oath of fealty, because he is the emperor of the world, and
so to speak a corporeal God for the world (Baldus [Brescia: 1490] cited in
Canning, 1987:25).
But Baldus does not stop there. In order to substantiate his claim of the divine
origin of the empire, he refers to the notion of the lex regia (incidentally derived
from Roman law), which declares the Roman people as the original source of the
emperor's authority. This would appear contradictory. If imperial authority is
originally derived from the people how then can it also be God-given? Of course
to the reader this would immediately constitute a problem, but Baldus puts forward
a clever and well-thought out solution. This solution is a combination of texts from
'Roman law, canon law, and the New Testament' (Canning, 1982: 26). Baldus
argues that the people were merely God's agents, and that the instatement of the
emperor by the people was itself an act decreed by God:
Note that the emperor's authority depends on the lex regia which was
promulgated at divine command; and thus the empire is said to be
immediately from God (Baldus [Lyon: 1498]cited in Canning,1987:26)
Baldus continues by elaborating on how the origin of the empire was an
intrinsically divine act, as it was instructed by divine command:
In the text there, 'at divine command', note that the emperor like the pope
is divinely constituted, and the empire proceeded from God. And thus the
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empire and the church fraternise, as in the beginning of the constitution.
Innocent [IV] however said that he does not know whence the empire
derived its origin. You can say that it had its beginnings from the sword
with divine permission, for he wished the whole world to be subjugated to
the Roman people. Thereupon the Roman people set up the emperor and
transferred all its power to him, and afterwards this was confirmed by the
express word of God, when he said, 'Let the image of God be rendered
unto God and the image of Caesar unto Caesar'. And this was also
approved afterwards by the church (Baldus [Lyon: 1498] cited in Canning,
1987:27).
In the above passage, Baldus discloses what can be described as a four-step
process of Roman rulership and imperial authority. Briefly, the process reads
something like this: At first the Roman people were given power, which was God-
granted. Next, the people transferred this power, through Godly instruction, to the
emperor. Christ's confirmation then recognised the emperor's power as God given.
The papacy institutionalised this process, as it played a role in approving the
emperor. This process essentially confirmed for Baldus that the emperor was
indeed appointed and instituted by God.
Baldus combines 'historical, theological and legal' arguments to achieve this
insight (Canning,1987: 27). Such an insight mirrors closely what can be described
as Ullmann's ascending and descending theories of medieval political thought and
government. Ullmann (1965: 12) argues that medieval political thought in general
can be categorised in two main theses of government and law, with both being
operative at different periods of the Middle Ages. The major characteristic of the
ascending theory is that original power is located in the people or the community
itself. The descending theory, on the other hand, views original power as that
which is located in a supreme being, which, 'because of the prevailing Christian
ideas, came to be seen as divinity itself (Ullmann, 1965:13).6 In this way,
Baldus's conception of the lex regia, which declares the Roman people as the
original source of power, is typically a manifestation ofUllmann's ascending
thesis.
6 An example of this according to Ullmann (1965:13) is evident in the writings of other prolific
medieval philosophers such as 'St Augustine, who in the fifth century had said that God distributed
the laws to mankind through the medium of kings , or St Thomas Aquinas, who expressed a similar
view when he argued that all 'power descended from God'.
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However this continnation of the divine origin of the emperor served as a
reminder to Baldus that in fact the claim of universal sovereignty of the emperor
was perfectly legitimate, and to doubt that would be to doubt the divine:
And again that supreme dignity was instituted by God, and cannot therefore
be suppressed by man. This is the reason why the empire is sempitemal at
the end (Baldus [Lyon 1498] cited in Canning,1987:27)
I will now attempt to illustrate how Baldus's context may provide something in
the way of understanding his conceptual position, in light of his interpretation of
the divine nature of imperial authority and his reconciliation of popular and
theocratic sources seen above. Thus I would like to reiterate a common theme in
this discussion, which views Baldus's conception of political authority as one that
is a product of the medieval condition. This is exposed in Baldus's solution of two
apparently contradictory sources of imperial authority, the popular and the
theocratic, which are eventually construed as an act of the divine. The idea of an
omnipotent god, in command and control of all things powerful, stems from the
dominant Christian ethos, which was central to the medieval experience. Similarly,
for Baldus it is a given that the source of power and authority was historically
restricted to the people of Rome. Why the Roman people were privileged
historically as rulers of the world and granted the capacity to transfer 'divine'
power is not open to question. Likewise, Baldus' use of the continnation of Christ
argument to emphasise divine intervention in the making of the emperor suggests
that his arguments rely solely on religiously bounded reasoning, rather than
concrete fact.
The de iure defacto argument
Baldus uses this conception of the divine nature of the emperor to develop the
second stage of his argument that seeks to accommodate territorially sovereign
cities in his overall notion of sovereignty. Here, Baldus draws from a juristic
distinction introduced by the jurist Bartolus, who applies the notion of de iure and
de facto to account for the sovereignty of other territorial bodies. It is this de iure
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de facto argument that in my view is the critical innovation of his political thought
as it forms the foundation of Baldus's theory of state territorial sovereignty.
Furthermore, it has become increasingly evident that this nuanced development of
the de iure de facto sovereignty argument is also an object of concern within
modem political theory itselC However, before I delve into Baldus's argument,
let me briefly examine what exactly the concepts of de iure and de facto represent
in juristic terms.
The term de iure can be translated as 'oflaw', as it refers to authority that is
embedded in normative principles that have been formalised over time. Thus de
iure recognition is the 'unconditional acknowledgment that a new government or
state is independent and wields effective power in the territory under its control'
(Elliott, 1957: 117).When applied to the medieval context, de iure authority
confirms that the emperor is indeed king of the world and thus grants him all-
encompassing rights of legitimacy. Hence it is an authority that exists in principle,
based on a set of higher norms. On the other hand, de facto rule or power can be
translated simply as authority that exists 'in fact". Here, political authority is not
derived from a formalised set of norms, so a particular political authority,
regardless of whether it is derived from lawful or legitimate means, may exercise
sovereignty in a given territory. De facto recognition is thus described as an 'act
whereby a new government or state is recognised as being actually independent
and wielding effective power in the territory under its control' although this may
not necessarily have been accorded by a long-standing legal or theoretical set of
norms (Elliott,1957:116). The importance of the conceptual distinction between
these two forms of sovereignty or rule in the modem day context for example, is
that 'it allows a distinction between the actual chance of someone in authority
being obeyed which might be a matter of the number of available machine guns,
and the way in which the right to be obeyed is justified, or seen as justifiable by
any chosen audience' (Robertson,1985:77).8
7 The de iure de facto idea has of recent times become important to international relations theory. See
for example Hirst & Thompson (1996) and Held, Mc Grew et al (1999).
8Robertson (1985:77) provides an interesting example of this, when he examines the official creation
of the State of Zimbabwe: 'the UK had de iure authority in what used to be known as Southern
Rhodesia, although in fact the society had been controlled by white Rhodesians in revolt against the
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Bartolus uses this critical distinction in his justification for sovereignty of
independent territorial bodies like city-states and kingdoms. His solution carefully
assesses juristic discourse and, in particular, the statement 'All peoples whom the
sovereign authority of our clemency rules' (Canning, 1987:64), which may be
understood in contrasting ways, that is, either as all-declaring or in a restrictive
sense. Baldus uses the de iure de facto distinction to make his interpretation:
It cannot rightly be used restrictively with respect to the law, but with
respect to facts it could be used restrictively according to Bartolus, and this
statement is new, notable and well-said (Baldus [Pavis:1495] cited in
Canning, 1987:64).
Baldus thus argues that independent territorial states such as cities and kingdoms
can attain fully independent powers ofjurisdiction' on a de facto basis, as de facto
authority can be conceptualised as something more than just power without
legitimacy. Many contemporary medieval analysts view this type of reasoning as a
considerable step within medieval political thought, as it accepts that 'legal rights,
duties and authority' are constructed 'from the facts of human existence' (Canning
1982:9). Furthermore, it denotes how Aristotelian philosophy influenced medieval
thinkers to conceive the realities of the political world or a state, which can be
understood in a this-worldly dimension.
Still, Baldus takes this reasoning to another level, by arguing that while de iure
sovereignty may constitute universal sovereignty, it is in fact 'not whole' as there
are'gaps' in the distribution of the jurisdiction of the emperor, especially where
independent territorial bodies operate (Canning 1982:10). Baldus's acceptance of
these independent territorial states is therefore articulated in a complex
explanation of what is described as the hierarchy of sovereign powers. I will
briefly mention the three types of sovereign power that occupy this framework of
sovereign hierarchy, as it informs to a large extent the remainder of Baldus's
argument on the issue of state territorial sovereignty.
UK government from 1965 until the creation of Zimbabwe. The distinction has considerable practical
effects in the world order, because most countries would have refused to recognise the de facto
government of that country, and would have assisted in applying what the UK took to be the legal
order, as it was the de iure ruler'.
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For Baldus, then, at the top of the scale of the hierarchy of sovereignty we find the
de iure imperial and papal powers (only in a temporal sphere) ofjurisdiction,
which grants these sovereign powers fall legitimacy and autonomy based on the
laws of the divine. Second to this, Baldus places the city-states and signori that
full under the aegis of the empire or papal patrimony but who enjoy defacto
authority, which equals sovereign power and independence. Lastly, Baldus places
the independent monarchies, which are within the empire, but possess sovereignty
from 'direct imperial rule' (Canning 1987: 65). In short, according to Baldus, it is
only the emperor who is considered a de iure authority. All other territorial bodies,
(except as we shall discover later in the discussion, 'papal temporal rulership') are
in effect de facto:
I reply that all are subject [i.e. to the emperor] de iure, and rightly so; but
not all are subject by custom, and they sin like the French and many other
kings ...And although the kingdom of France is not part of the Roman
empire, it does not however follow that the empire is not therefore
universal, for it is one thing to say, "universal", and another "whole"
(Baldus [Pavis:l495] cited in Canning, 1987: 14).
The conceptualisation of these de facto rights for ten'itorially sovereign bodies
such as city-states had important implications for medieval political thought. It
indicated that despite the origins of divine authority as instituted by God, a human
this-worldly construction of sovereignty could grant independent territorial entities
genuine sovereignty and legitimacy in their territorial rule. This said, the de iure
de facto solution needs to be scrutinised as a 'medieval rather than a modem' view
of territorial sovereignty, in that 'universal and territorial sovereignty exist in a
form of hierarchy with one kind not excluding the other' (Canning,1987:66).
Nonetheless, although Baldus reserves de iure authority for the emperor and pope
(he being a product of his context), his expanded notion of what defacto may
constitute for the territorial state seems to indicate that these late medieval
pronouncements of de facto sovereignty suggest something further and deeper for
the conception of political authority for the territorial state. Such an understanding
of de facto sovereignty becomes particularly interesting in light of the
contemporary debates on the crisis of the modern state, where some thinkers
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grapple with questions of territorial sovereignty by assessing the notion of de facto
sovereignty:
First I ask a very broad question: whether it has ever been possible to
justify the existence of nation-states as sovereign occupiers of certain
definite tracts of the surface of the globe (whether the territorial security of
states could ever be expected to hold in anything but de facto terms. If not,
then the insecurity of national states and their borders is a generic
phenomenon, and cannot be seen as a sign of special and contemporary
crisis (see Hont, 1995: 171).
Baldus and the role ofconsent
Baldus develops the de facto argument even further, when he considers in detail
how exactly territorial sovereignty for city-states can be theorised, even though the
COlpUS iuris civilis provides little leeway in allowing for a juristic conception of
the sovereignty of city-states. In fact, the position of cities in the corpus is that
they were simply 'licit corporations subject to imperial confirmation for their legal
rights' (Canning,1987:94). In this way, we find that in the immediate background
of Baldus's theory on sovereignty of cities are Bartolus's former conclusions on
the issue, rather than the texts of Roman law. Indeed it was Bartolus who first
developed an argument that shifted the focus of sovereignty from the city to the
city-populi. He examined the idea of consent in the process oflaw-making in
Italian cities and saw it to be a product of the will of people and not that of the
emperor. This led Bartolus to devise a compelling argument, which postulated
that, the 'element of consent' in 'popular law-making', be it statute or custom,
could certainly act as a substitute to the will of superior (Canning 1987:96). The
civitas quae superoirem non recognoscit (the city which does not recognise a
superior) is as a result apopulus liber (free people).9 Furthermore, Bartolus
attributes to the city the same powers ofjurisdiction in its specific territory, which
the emperor enjoys in the empire as a whole. Thus the city-state is regarded as a
'civitas sibi princeps (city which is its own emperor)' (Canning,1987:97).
9 It can be argued that this sort of reasoning on the part of Baldus hints towards a proto-republican style
argument. See Skinner (1979), Foundations ofModern Political Thought vol 1.
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Drawing on his notion of the overarching framework of the hierarchy of
sovereignty, it is Baldus who demonstrates that the de facto solution would
achieve the greatest 'level of sovereignty of which cities are capable' (Canning
1987: 93). Like Bartolus, Baldus maintains the independence of cities in relation
to the recognition of a superior. He identifies two distinct levels of self-
government. The first of these is 'local autonomy' below the level of sovereignty,
and the second is 'full independence' which is sovereignty itself (Canning 1987:
98). Baldus then classifies that a populus can differ with regards to how much
legislative power it wields, and this would ascertain the degree of autonomy and
rights ofjurisdiction that it would enjoy:
And the first question is whether every people is allowed to make statutes
without the permission of a superior. And it seems that they are not. You
are to say this: either the people which wishes to make a statute has no
jurisdiction, but are subject to some city, as are villages and fortified places
in the contado; or it has full jurisdiction conceded by the emperor or
prescribed by custom in temporal or civil matters and in criminal ones, and
this can be the case; or it has limited jurisdiction, for instance in civil
matters only. If it has no jurisdiction, then either it wishes to make statutes
about the distribution of money or something else which does not concern
jurisdiction in which case it can do so, as long as such a statute does not
involve financial corruption; or it wishes to make statutes about the
deciding and hearing of cases, and it cannot do this without the permission
of a superior on account of the aforementioned rights and [X. 1.2.8 & 9]
support this. And the reason is that making such statutes is part of
jurisdiction, as is clear from the definition put forward in the gloss, and
since it does not have jurisdiction, it cannot therefore have what derives
from jurisdiction, then it can do so [ie. make statutes] without a superior's
authorisation... as it clear in this and in [D.I.I.9], at the word, populus
where permission to make statutes is given without distinction (Baldus
[Pavia:1489] cited in Canning, 1987: 98).
Baldus takes this argument a step further, when he attempts to neatly combine
Bartolus's argument with his own. Thus in his overall account ofjustifying the
sovereignty of the territorial city-state, he introduces the ius gentium argument.
According to Baldus the ius gentium provides a juristic breakthrough, as it serves
to stand as the universal law common to all man:
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The ius gentium is what proceeds from the reason and understanding of
peoples, and all peoples use it to an almost equal extent. It is always good
and equitable, and mankind could not live without it, as here and below,
and it differs from natural law as the brain of man differs from that of
animals (Baldus [Pavia:1489] cited in Canning,1987:105).
Baldus regards the ius gentium as the' source of people's existence', arguing quite
skilfully that 'people and towns or villages, exist by the ius gentium and come into
existence without the authorisation of a superior' (Baldus [Pavia: 1489] cited in
Canning, 1987: 105). Furthermore he argues that the notion of government
(regimen) is innate to people's existence, and is thus a logical consequence of the
ius gentium: 'a people for the very reason that it has existence, consequently has
governmental power as part of that existence' (Baldus [Pavia: 1489] cited in
Canning,1987: 105). According to Baldus then, people exist as regimen populi ,
self-government by the people. This feature of the people's self-governing
capability rests on the fact that they possess the' autonomous capacity to legislate
through the exercise of consent':
Moreover we should not demand more than the law does, because we
should be content with the stand the law takes. But the law is content with
the consent of the people, and therefore we should be too. Nor can it be
said that it speaks in that law only of the Roman people, and the reason for
this is provided by the beginning of the law, where it speaks only of
another people (Baldus [Pavia: 1489] cited in Canning, 1987: 105).
For Baldus, as long as the people legislate that which is noble and good, they can
exist autonomously:
If therefore statutes are good ones bearing in mind the requirements of the
place in question and the preservation of its public good, they do no need
anyone else's direction, because they have been confirmed by their own
natural justice (Baldus [Pavia:1489] cited in Canning,1987:106).
Baldus and the non-recognition ofa superior
Baldus extends the ius gentium argument to confirm the 'non-recognition of a
superior' in relation to the sovereignty of the city (Canning, 1987:113). He argues
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that a city (civitas) without the presence of a superior overseeing it in practical
tenus is entitled to liberty and self-government:
In the case of cities I do not however think they could act without the
authority of a superior who possessed the actual power of one. But cities,
which live in their own liberty, and enjoy absolute self-government do not
require anybody else's assistance, because they use their own laws. The
position is the same whether they act on the authority of a privilege or by
virtue of prescribed custom (Baldus [Pavia: 1489] cited in Canning,
1987: 113).
This notion of excluding a superior, reiterates Bartolus's theory ofpopulus liber,
which as we have seen above declares a people free because of the role of consent
in the making ofpeople's laws, which Bartolus uses as justification for
sovereignty of independent Italian cities. The condition of Baldus' s historical
context is a possible force behind Baldus's conclusion that cities are indeed
sovereign within their territories. Here I refer to the practical reality of cities in
Italy functioning as independent entities, without the involvement of a superior:
These days the superior has in fact no power since the cities do not obey
Caesar. .. [A superior], may be said to be lacking, when he cannot take
effective decisions, like the emperor and the pope as regards action against
the tyrants of Lombardy and also against the peoples who live as by their
own law in de facto liberty (Baldus [Pavia: 1489] cited in Canning,
1987:114).
Therefore, to a large extent, Baldus believes that a solution which accords
sovereignty to the city is inevitable, as it merely mirrors the prevailing status quo:
But, as I said, cities which in reality do not recognise superiors and
appropriate regalian rights for themselves do this by custom, and what they
have always has an established custom should not, it seems, be changed at
all, as above. Let us bear this with equanimity, because it is not of our
doing. But it is agreed de iure that power reserved to the emperor alone is
denied to cities. But fonuerly there was an emperor who looked after the
authority and general good of the commonwealth; now however, there is
not the same bond of good faith between emperor and subjects, with the
result that things have of necessity gone from one extreme to another
(Baldus [Pavia:1489] cited in Canning, 1987:114)
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In view of Baldus's arguments above, I hope to underline what I perceive as two
important outcomes of his method of conceptualising state sovereignty. The first
of these is connected to Baldus's vision in observing his historical context, and the
attitude he employs as a civilian lawyer (see Canning,1987:ll4-115). It is evident
that Baldus's eventual reasoning rests on his acceptance of the factual realities of
his situation. At no point does he attempt to privilege the position of the city over
the emperor, but instead carefully uses key Roman law concepts to make sense of
his lived reality. The second point, which in a sense relates to the first, is the issue
of security in relation to territory, which Baldus uses to demonstrate the lack of
effective authority:
[A superior], may be said to be lacking, when he cannot take effective
decisions, like the emperor and the pope as regards action against the
tyrants ofLombardy... (Baldus [Pavia:1489] cited in Canning,1987:ll4)
As I have signalled elsewhere in this discussion, security as a result of effective
authority is integral to the conceptualisation of territorial state sovereignty. As
Baldus points out non-effective leadership against the 'tyrants of Lombardy'
denotes a lack of successful political authority, and an insecure territorial space.
This measures the need for some other sort of solution, which for Baldus (once
reconciled juristically) is sovereignty for the territorial city-state.
The relationship ofthe papacy and the sovereign territorial state
As I have indicated earlier in this discussion, apart from the emperor, there existed
another competing universalist claim for sovereignty in the form of the papacy,
which sought to extend its power to matters beyond the spiritual. As with the
imperial claim for universal sovereignty, it is the nature of western medieval
society, in particular the deeply religious Christian influence that pern1eated Latin
Europe, that makes certain such a claim cannot be simply ignored. Simply, the
claim of ecclesiastical jurisdiction was considered justifiable on the grounds of its
divine origin. It is evident that jurists such as Baldus saw the pope as a living
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reality, firmly believing that 'the power and authority of the church were facts that
they could not ignore' (Canning,1982: 18).
In this regard, Baldus attempted to construct an appropriate conceptual
understanding of papal political authority in relation to both the emperor and
territorial states. Baldus, as a canonist of renown, deals with this subject in much
depth, assessing in detail the position of the pope within his general theory of the
hierarchy of sovereignty. It is not possible in the scope of my discussion to
examine this in all of its detail, except to direct the reader to some of the important
aspects of Baldus's arguments concerning the universal sovereignty of the pope. 10
It is important to note that whilst Baldus accepts the papal claim to sovereignty,
his view is distinct from the hierocratic claims for ultimate universal sovereignty,
which were (save from a few) especially 'out-of-date in the fourteenth century'
(Canning 1987:20). Instead, Baldus introduces the concept ofplenitudo potestatis
(plenitude ofpower) which views the sovereignty of the pope as unrestricted and
supreme, except when applied to laws which are natural and divine (Canning,
1987: 31):
[The pope] is not only a bishop but the chief of bishops and of others whom
the intellect can imagine. To him has been given the full power of the keys
and that highest and unrestricted power which is called power freed from
all constraints of canon law and from every limiting rule except the law of
the gospels and the apostles ...For the statement that the pope can do all
things should be understood to mean that he so acts using the key of
discretion which does not deviate from the rules of the divine law and the
precepts of the natural (Baldus [Brescia:149l] cited in Canning, 1987:31)
It is here that Baldus illustrates the limitations ofpapal power by clearly stating
that divine and natural law constrain papal action. Furthermore, Baldus's
arguments seek to do something different: first to locate papal and imperial
sovereignty within the hierarchy of sovereignty, then to conceptually limit
10 Baldus describes in immense detail the relationship between the powers of the 'two divinely
instituted authorities' the emperor and the pope with reference to the practical realities of his context
such as the impact of the Donation of Constantine. For further discussions of this, see Canning, The
Political Thought o/Baldus de Ubaldis, 1987:pp.30-64.
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universal sovereignty, by differentiating between two types of sovereignty, the
'spiritual' and the 'temporal'.
Of spiritual sovereignty, Baldus concedes that the pope is the ultimate universal
sovereign based on two significant historic facts stemming from the Christian
tradition. The first of these is the act of coronation, or the right of the pope to
confer the imperial title on the emperor:
The emperor is crowned with three crowns. The gold crown however is not
necessary for conferring on him the power of administration which he
possesses as soon as he has been legitimately elected in harmony or by the
majority. What effect does the crown have? I reply that it is the final
confirmation...You are to say that the last crown of gold which is
conferred at Rome gives the ultimate perfection and is the chief of all
crowns which are beneath heaven (Baldus [Brescia: 1491] cited in Canning,
1987:36).
According to Baldus, this final confirmation of the emperor and conferment of the
crown by the pope, is the decisive factor in the creation of the imperial title, as the
pope is god's worldly representative ultimately ensuring that coronation is an act
of the divine. Using similar reasoning, Baldus then argues that the pope also
enjoys spiritual sovereignty over the emperor, as the pope has the right to 'depose'
.an emperor 'in extreme crisis' (Canning 1982: 18):
[The Roman emperor] has no one above him except God from whom
however he may expect punishment ifhe commits injustice. From time to
time the pope has deposed him for enormities in his rulership, as in [Sext,
2.14.2], because the pope is more the vicar of God than the emperor is, for
the pope is equated with the sun which is greater than the moon in quantity,
dignity, office and sublimity (Baldus [Brescia: 1491] cited in Canning,
1987:38).
Here Baldus reiterates the pope's superiority over the emperor using an example
of the sun and moon to denote the different degrees of power that each of them
enjoy. It is the emperor whose spiritual sovereignty is limited. Baldus consistently
argues that whilst the position of the emperor is sacred and holy (spiritually of
great magnitude), it is the pope that stands slightly above the emperor in
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superiority for the simple fact that the existence of the imperial title is entirely
dependent on papal confirmation:
Note further ... that nothing is greater and holier than the empire with the
understood exception of the apostle of St Peter. For since the pope confirms
the emperor this is a clear sign of his superiority, as in Auth. 'De
defensoribus civitatum', 'interim' [Coll.,3.2 = Nov.,15], and thus the
emperor swears fidelity to the lord pope (Baldus [Brescia: 1491] cited in
Canning,1987:38).
Having made abundantly clear the superiority of the papacy in matters of the
spiritual, how does Baldus attempt to delineate the domain of the temporal? Of
course, here it becomes much trickier, as the temporal sphere consists of the actual
territories in which these competing powers might enjoy jurisdiction, and thus
universal sovereignty is questionable. A statement such as this indicates that it is
the emperor whom Baldus believes enjoys greater sovereignty in the temporal
sphere:
But the emperor has a superior, namely the pope...Ajust pope is the
supreme vicar of God. Anyone who says to the contrary is a liar. As
regards the world the emperor is greater than the pope, and the pope, ifhe
is just, is greater as regards God: he is not greater than the emperor in this
world (Baldus [Brescia:1491] cited in Canning,1987:38).
This is because Baldus's view of temporal sovereignty is born directly from his
historical context. Indeed the 'papal-imperial' conflicts for power, the defeats of
the papacy, and the rise of territorial states meant that universal papal temporal
power was practically an 'irrelevant' claim (Canning,1987: 45). Thus, what was of
immediate practical concern to Baldus was the pope's actual territorial power in
central Italy where the patrimony of St Peter was situated (Canning,1987:45). It is
only in these lands that papal sovereignty and the sovereignty of territorial states
intersect. Let us briefly consider how this may take place, and what implications it
may have for the sovereign territorial state.
For Baldus, temporal sovereignty and jurisdiction belong to the emperor, 'It is
certain ... that temporal jurisdiction is, as it were, rooted in the emperor (Baldus
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[Brescia:1490] cited in Canning,1987:38)'. Nonetheless he attempts to consider
how temporal sovereignty can be resolved so that the pope enjoys ultimate
sovereignty in the papal patrimony, which is his territorial dominion, whilst the
emperor maintains sovereignty over the rest of the imperial territories. Baldus
constructs two juristic terms terrae imperii (lands of the empire) and terrae
ecclesiae (lands of the church) to explicate his argument:
The emperor possesses imperial majesty everywhere because majesty is not
divided, as is neither character nor fame. But he does not have imperial
administration everywhere, for he has an imperium divided with the pope
in such a way that the lands of the Roman church are not subject to the
emperor either directly or indirectly...Again, just as the pope does not
legitimise in the lands of the empire, neither does the emperor in those of
the pope, as in the said [X.4.l 7.13], for in the papal lands the emperor is
reduced to a status like that of a private person, and is he has no jurisdiction
he cannot therefore grant privileges (Baldus [Brescia: 1490] cited in
Canning,1987:38).
It is apparent that for Baldus, the fundamental distinction between terrae imperii
(lands of the empire) and terrae ecclesiae (lands of the church) is to ensure that
temporal sovereignty of the empire is divided practically between the pope and the
emperor, so that each one is the supreme political authority in his particular
territory and that neither is undermined.
Nevertheless, how does this division ofjurisdiction affect the sovereignty of the
territorial state? Baldus's response denotes a coherent view, as it applies the
principles of the 'non-recognition of a superior' argument, which I have
considered earlier in this discussion. Simply, it argues that independent territorial
states such as the cites of 'Perugia and Bologna' which belong to the terrae
ecclesiae enjoy the exact 'relationship' with the pope as the cities in the terrae
imperii enjoy with the emperor (Canning,1987:20). Thus, the territorial states
belonging to the lands of the church are once again de facto sovereign, subject
only to the de iure authority of the papacy.
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The issue ofterritory
Throughout this discussion, I have suggested that Baldus's conception of
sovereignty, be it de iure or defacto, that is of the empire or the city, is
territorially bounded. Despite this, I argue, it is still important, for us to achieve a
clearer sense of Baldus's official position on territory in relation to sovereignty.
For this, we need firstly to determine what juristic term is employed by Baldus
when he refers to the city without a superior. According to contemporary medieval
analysts (see Canning, 1987;Ullmann,1949) Baldus regards 'cities which in their
government are not subject to a superior either de facto or by de iure concession'
as provinciae, a term which applies to 'both sovereign and autonomous cities'.
Baldus situates this definition of the city as a provincia into his theory of the
hierarchy of sovereignty, which in effect is a theory that stratifies sovereign power
based on juristic entitlement and which limits jurisdiction accordingly.
But by what means does Baldus suppose the sovereign power and jurisdiction of
the city can be negotiated? The answer points directly to territory. For Baldus the
'city replaces the emperor within its territory' and thus 'territory defines as much
as it limits a city's sovereignty' (Canning,1987: 127). Baldus's analysis of the
territorial sovereignty of the city is exemplified in his conceptualisation of the
ideas of banishment and extradition, practices that were distinctive of medieval
society.
Banishment may be described as a form ofpenalty practiced in fourteenth-century
Italy (Canning, 1987:l 27). Of banishment, Baldus argues:
Banishment does not affect a person except in the territory from which he
is banished. This, therefore, is a penalty applying to a person in a particular
place and not to a person simply, for jurisdiction which is limited as to
place does not extend outside that place, for jurisdiction adheres to a
territory, but a territory has its own boundaries ...And thus, so to speak,
such outlaws are banished from a particular part, namely the territory of the
person banishing them, and are not outlawed as regards another part,
namely in other places in which they have free domicile (Baldus
[Pavia:1489] cited in Canning, 1987: 128).
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In Baldus's above statement on banishment, we are able to ascertain several
important points with regards to territory. The most obvious of these is that the
practice of banishment implies that a city's jurisdiction is territorially bounded.
This is because the penalty of banishment can only be applied to the specific
geographically bordered space (that is the actual city) in which it was meted out.
In other words, the jurisdictional extent of the penalty is limited to the city in
which it was sanctioned. Its sentence would be rendered fruitless elsewhere.
According to Baldus, the notion of banishment can thus be construed as a signifier
of territorial sovereignty of the city (Canning 1987:128).
With regards to extradition, Baldus constructs an argument on similar lines. He
observes that cities which self-govern should not extradite members because they
are equals. He uses the example of an outlaw in Pisa not fearing extradition in
another self-governing city, as an indicator of the limits ofjurisdiction of every
city:
These days, however, we do not use these extraditions except in lands
which are subject to one general ruler, and not however in lands which are
not subject to the rule of anyone else. And this is the content of the custom
which must be observed because it is general and oflong standing. We
therefore see that outlaws from the city of Pisa can stay here in security:
they do not however fear extradition because it is not the practice that
should apply between equals (Baldus [Brescia: 1490] cited in Canning,
1987:129).
In effect, Baldus alludes to the fact that the curtailing of extradition denotes the
territorial sovereignty of cities, because every city has a jurisdiction which is
bounded within a particular territory. The concept of cities as equals further
indicates that each city bears its own territorial integrity. This type of reasoning
arises from the 'basic juristic principle': 'equals do not have authority over each
other' (Canning,1987: 129). Furthermore, Baldus's reference to the idea ofa long
standing custom fits into his general argument of the role of custom in originating




Any study of Baldus's juristic, conceptual understanding of the development of
the idea of the territorial state is not complete without a mention of his important
contribution in abstracting the idea of the state through corporation theory. Today,
many political theorists view this early fourteenth century, medieval contribution
by the Commentators as a significant contribution in the historical process of the
'development of the early modem idea of the state' (see Canning,1982:23,
Skinner, 1978:352-358). It is particularly important, then, that I outline to the
reader these juristic 'corporational concepts', which were utilised by Baldus,
amongst others, to conceptualise the independent, territorial state as an 'abstract
entity distinct from its government and members' (Canning,1982: 23).
Of course, for the purposes of this discussion, it is not necessary to deal with this
subject in all its and depth and entirety. Instead, it is more important to
demonstrate the juristic wholeness of Baldus's theory ofterritorially sovereign
states. Here I refer to what I perceive as the two critical levels of his argument. On
the first level, Baldus displays considerable theoretical depth in producing a
juristic account, which accommodates the twelfth century phenomenon of
independent territorially sovereign states (both cities and kingdoms) in his overall
political thought, as I have outlined in the discussion above. Moreover, on the
second level, Baldus goes even further, when he links this with corporation theory,
so as to produce a full-scale theory of the idea of the territorial state, and define in
greater detail the nature of these territorial entities (Canning,1987:363).
When looking at Baldus's corporation theory there are two related issues that need
to be probed. The first is to examine the concept of corporation, which Baldus uses
to conceptualise the state as an abstract entity:
Every corporation is called a body, because it is something compound and
collective in which the bodies [of men] are like the material. The
corporation is however said to be the form, that is the formal condition
[D.8.2.LI]. A college, therefore is an image which is perceived more by the
intellect than the senses (Baldus [Lyon:1525] cited in Canning,1987:188).
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In the above Baldus suggests that the sovereign territorial state made up of a self-
governing, self-legislating populus, can be defined as a corporation in two
respects: both as a body, which is composed of real, living members, and as an
'abstract entity' that is separate from these members. Furthermore, according to
Baldus the populus in its abstract sense is an 'immortal entity', which is 'able to
consent and act through the instrumentality of its mortal members organised in a
structure of councils and represented city officials' (Canning, 1982:24). Simply,
although the populus is politically active through the exercise of consent etc, in its
earthly dimension, it is through the medium of these functions that a basis for its
abstraction can be formed.
Baldus's description of the populus as an abstract entity is advanced even further,
when he employs the juristic concept of a persona representing the corporation as
a single, unitary concept:
Every collection of people, corresponding to one man, is to be regarded as
a single person. It is also a corporate person which is understood as one
person, but consists of many bodies, like the people; and this person
similarly is regarded as corresponding to one man is considered to be an
individual body. It is clear therefore that this word 'person', is sometimes
used for an individual, sometimes for a corporation and sometimes for the
head or prelate (Baldus [Lyon: 1525] cited in Canning,1987:189).
This usage of the concept ofpersona (person) in reference to a corporation is a
development of the existing medieval theoretical concept of 'personaficta (fictive
person) first 'formulated by Innocent IV' in the thirteenth century (Canning,
1982:24). This 'constructive use oflegal fiction' in reference to territorial states as
abstract 'corporational entities' allowed Baldus to assign these states a unique
'legal personality': 'that is to say, these states as legal persons had a legal
existence and capacity' distinct from its members (Canning,1988:474).
Let us now consider the implications corporation theory had for the territorial
state. Baldus constructs a detailed application of corporation theory to both sorts of
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medieval territorial states that is cities and kingdoms, deriving the fundamental
conclusion that all territorial states can be identified as a corporation, a collection
of people belonging to a city or kingdom, which possesses an abstract, perpetual
dimension, distinct from its members or government.
In this way, the fourteenth-century juristic idea of the state as an abstract entity is a
formidable and valuable contribution to the development of the early-modem idea
of the state. I I However, since Baldus accepts, on a first level, that the territorial
state is an association of real men that exists within a 'this-worldly dimension' and
that is furthermore territorially sovereign 'within the overall structure of the
hierarchy of sovereignty' and by this conception de facto sovereign, this view of
the state is clearly 'medieval' in its outlook (Canning,1987: 207). As I have
echoed throughout this discussion, it is thus important that we consider the
'limitations' within which the term 'state' in its modem sense can be employed.
Conclusion
The Commentators of the late thirteenth and fourteenth century are unique in their
practical application of legal science to problems and realities of their political
condition. As with the emergence of the territorial state in the form of independent
cities and kingdoms it is in the juristic tradition that we find a sustained need to
accommodate these territorial bodies within their larger conceptual and theoretical
framework.
In this chapter I have demonstrated how the medieval historical context is critical
to the views that arise thereof. After introducing the reader to some of the main
events that transpired in the build up to the political reality of territorial states in
the late middle ages, I then attempted to probe into the civilian law tradition of the
Commentators. Here I distinguished between the Neopolitans, and the French and
Italian Commentators, who each applied the principles of Roman law to
11 Hobbes in the celebrated work of modem political thought the Leviathan (1991) presents his central
project of the conceptualisation of the modem idea of the state, as an abstract entity distinct from any
person or government.
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theoretically account for territorial states, yet achieving different outcomes. From
the Neopolitans, it was revealed that the ius gentium argument was critical to their
understanding of the territorial state, through which they justified the 'denial of
universal sovereignty of the emperor, and treated independent kingdoms as
existing on the same basis as the territorially restricted empire' (Canning,1982:4).
However, in contrast, the French and Italian Commentators sought to deal with the
phenomenon of territorial states differently.
Focusing on the writings of a single thinker, Baldus de Ubaldis, I have
demonstrated, in the discussion above, the divine symbolic importance of the
emperor and pope, so much so that it is their universal claim for sovereignty,
which forms the basic starting point from which any theory of territorial states had
to be developed. Employing a distinct de iure de facto argument, Baldus argues
that the sovereignty of territorial states needs to be conceptualised within an
overall understanding of the 'hierarchy of sovereignty'. It is upon the perpetual





The development of the idea of territorial sovereignty and the state, in the writings
of fourteenth century scholars, reflects the complex nature of political thought
during that period, as well as the changing political realities of its historical
context. Thus far a significant part of my enquiry has been devoted to exploring
the manner in which the jurists or civilian lawyers of the fourteenth century
applied and exercised their conceptual and juristic tools in articulating a theory of
state territorial sovereignty (albeit with a medieval outlook). This has therefore
confirmed my initial claim that a conceptual argument for the political idea of
territorial sovereignty is evident in the medieval period, insofar as it may be
viewed in light of the extraordinary historical events during this period that saw
the emergence of the territorially sovereign state.
In this last chapter I wish to emphasise and re-establish this claim of historical
continuity in political ideas and concepts, by analysing the writings of another
prominent medieval philosopher, namely Marsilius of Padua. Marsilius has been
widely considered as 'the most remarkable political writer of the Middle Ages'
(Canning 1996: 154). His publication of 1324, Defensor Pacis (Defender of
Peace), is said to be one of the most 'extraordinary', 'thorough and original'
treatises to emerge from the Middle Ages in general (see Coleman,1999;
Canning,1999; Watt,1988).
Like the civilian lawyers or jurists such as Baldus, who wrote during his period,
Marsilius too was deeply influenced by the events of his time. His intellectual and
political milieu for example was the city-state ofPadua. Marsilius's writing could
be described as a political commentary of his immediate experiences of the Italian
city-republic. As an active member of the city-republic, Marsilius was able to
observe and critically assess issues surrounding governance and the struggle for
political authority. This however in no way suggests that Marsilius's political
theory is 'merely historical redescription' (Coleman,1999:138). Rather it
highlights that his sophisticated philosophical understanding of the political
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questions surrounding the problems of civil discord in the Italian city-republic, and
the manner in which it can be remedied, drew significant insight from his practical
knowledge.
In the Defender ofPeace Marsilius identifies one major and destructive cause of
civil unrest and political turmoil: papal power, authority and jurisdiction. To this
end, it is correct to state that Marsilius's project is essentially about confronting
papal claims to universal temporal jurisdiction, and to demonstrate that this claim
commonly justified by the notion of 'plentitude of power' (plenitudo postesis) has
no sound theoretical basis. Marsilius 'intended to warn' all cities and states 'of the
present and impending danger' of the papacy, and its attempts to 'usurp the
temporal jurisdictions of all civil regimes' (Canning, 1999: 135). This for Marsilius
was the true cause of universal civil discord. The papal desire for universal
sovereignty he therefore argued must be unequivocally rejected if real peace and
political harmony is to prevail. Marsilius's prior objective in the Defender of
Peace, was thus centred on intellectually demolishing the papal claim to temporal
political authority.
What is particularly original about Marsilius however, and what sets him apart
from his heretic contemporaries, is the precise manner in which he attempts to
engage ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Here I refer to the complex manner in which he
formulates his argument, which allows him to produce a real sovereign alternative.
As I will highlight in the rest of this discussion Marsilius for example, examines
the structure, nature and role of the citizen body in great philosophical detail. This
process ultimately allows him to ascribe legitimate sovereign authority to a single
entity, the universitas civium (corporation of citizens) within any territory. It is this
aspect of Marsilius's thought that forms the foundation of my enquiry.
In this chapter it is my aim to identify all significant major stages of Marsilius's
arguments, which contribute to his conceptualisation of sovereignty. I will use
these arguments located mainly in Discourse I ofDefender ofPeace, to argue that
a notion of state territorial sovereignty as that which belongs to only one supreme
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political authority the universitas civium (corporation ofcitizens) is once again
evident in the theorisation of fourteenth century political thought. Furthermore, I
will frequently bring to light the influence of Aristotlean philosophy on
Marsilius's thought and the impact it had on his scholastic insights.
A background ofpapal domination in the fourteenth century
Any study of Marsilius's political thought would not be complete without an
overview of the relations between the papacy and other secular political authority
prior to and during the fourteenth century, as it is this ongoing and varied
historical context that influenced both the writing of the Defender ofPeace, as
well as the contents it espoused. This, according to Marsilius is the intervention by
the Christian Church or the papacy in political matters over secular rulers, and of
the papal greed for universal sovereign power. According to Marsilius, this
attempt to appropriate the temporal jurisdictions of civil regimes is 'utterly
inimical to the human race and will in the end, if it is not checked, bring
unendurable harm to every civil order and country' (Marsilius [1324] 2005:5 ).
Papal versus secular relations during this period belong to an extensive and
complicated history, which have formed the subject oflengthy historical,
theological and philosophical study. It is therefore not within the scope of my
discussion to deal with this at any length. Nonetheless, what I do hope is to bring
to light for the reader what I perceive as two significant events of papal versus
secular conflict; the one between Philip IV and Boniface VIII and the other
between Ludwig of Bavaria and John XXII. These conflicts and the 'hierocratic
pronouncements' they produced have been cited as historical evidence of 'the
papal greed for secular power' (Coleman, 1999:140). Furthermore, it is the
papacy's desire for universal sovereignty that not only inspired Marsilius's work,
but also what directed his 'scorching polemic' (Watt, 1988:416). For our purposes
then, they are well worth revisiting.
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Phi/ip IV and Boniface VIII (1290c-135Oc)
After defeating the German emperors, a century earlier, by the late Middle Ages,
the papacy sought the support of the French monarchs, and so was 'normally
unwilling to endanger good relations with them' (Canning, 1988: 346). The
conflict between Pope Boniface VIII and the French King Philip IV therefore
marks the critical turning point in the history of church-state relations in the late
Middle Ages. Of this I will only discuss the two most significant disputes between
these competing powers, which illustrate the struggle for power and sovereignty,
in the relations between papal and secular rule.
The first of the disputes between Boniface VIII and Philip IV occurred around
1296. The conflict was essentially a financial one, centred on the issue of wealth
and taxation. The church like every ambitious great power required more money,
and there arose a conflict of interest over its financial needs and those of the new
national monarchies like France and England who were in the process of 'building
up an efficient but costly central administrative machine to replace the old feudal
system of extreme decentralisation' (Ebenstein, 2000:262).
In April 1296, Bonficace VIII issued the bull Clericis Laicos where he explicitly
stated that secular rulers had no jurisdiction over the church and its property, and
that no lay authority was authorised to levy taxes on the church, neither was the
clergy sanctioned to pay these taxes. Furthermore he argued that the 'imposition of
paying such taxes without papal approval was put under the sanction of
excommunication from the church' (Ebenstein, 2000:262). Neither England nor
France would accept such a declaration favourably, as exempting the church (and
all its vast property) from taxation would produce disastrous financial
consequences. In addition such a declaration would massively undermine secular
authority. Boniface VIII 'rapidly lost' the first dispute with Philip IV 'when the
latter forbade the export of gold and silver from France, thus damaging papal
revenues' and rendering the pope powerless to impose his doctrine (Canning
1996: 138). Boniface VIII resorted to issuing another bill Etsi de statu, which
granted Philip the right to tax the clergy.
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The second major dispute between Boniface VIII and Philip IV occurred in about
1301, and this time concerned the decision by Philip IV to arrest and try the
Bishop ofPalmiers for blasphemy, heresy and treason in his royal court of Senlis.
Boniface VIII considered this an infringement of the principle of canon law which
stated that a bishop could only be tried and judged by a pope. He resorted to
confrontation and demanded the Bishop's release, and went further to revoke the
privileges of taxing the clergy as stated in Etsi de statu. He also convened a
council for all the French bishops in Rome, to 'discuss the preservation of
ecclesiastical liberty, the reform of the kingdom, the correction of the king's
excesses and the good government of the kingdom' (Canning, 1996: 138).' Thus in
1302, Boniface VIII issued the bull Unam Sanctum, widely acknowledge as one of
the most important church documents in history. This document expressed most
openly the papalist position on spiritual and temporal power:
there is "neither salvation not remission of sins outside the holy catholic
and apostolic church this one and only church had one body and one head,
not two heads as if it were a monster. .. there are two swords, a spiritual
and a temporal, and both swords are in the power of the church, the one by
the hand of the priest, the other by the hand of kings and knights, but at the
will and sufferance of the priest. .. One sword, moreover, ought to be under
the other, and the temporal authority to be subjected to the spiritual. ..A
spiritual man judges all things, but he himself is judged by no one... We
therefore declare, say define, and pronounce that it is altogether a necessity
of salvation for every human creature to be subject to the Roman Pontiff'
(Boniface VIII cited in Ebenstein, 2000:263).
In response, Philip IV, who by this stage was already excommunicated gathered
support in France and planned a coup which would capture the pope in Anangi and
bring him back to France to face a General Council of the church that would try,
condemn and depose him. However Boniface VIII never survived this, dying a
few weeks after being imprisoned, and was succeeded by Pope Clement V.
It is interesting to note that at the point in which this second conflict occurred, the
issue of universal spiritual and temporal authority produced a flood of tracts
devoted to the questions raised in the Unam Sanctum (Canning 1987:140). It is in
I For further reading on this subject see Strayer's, The Reign ofPhilip the Fair (1980:267).
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the context of these developments and debates on spiritual and temporal power,
the role of the papacy in territorially independent kingdoms and states, as well as
the structure of government and the nature of political authority, that we see
Marsilius's systematic and thorough treatment of this subject emerging in the late
Middle Ages. Undoubtedly, it is the papal rule of Boniface VIII that Marsilius
selects as one of the chief culprits of civil strife in the Defender saying that
Boniface's conception of power is destructive and expressed 'in language as
insolent as it is harmful and contrary to the meaning of Scripture, and based upon
metaphysical demonstrations' (Marsilius [1324] 2005:372).
Ludwig ofBavaria and John XXII (1305-1378)
Following the disputes between Philip IV and Boniface VIII, in around 1309, the
pope and bishops of Rome moved from the holy city of Rome to a temporary
papal possession in Avignon, France. During this period, the last medieval conflict
between pope and emperor took place (Canning, 1988:343). This dispute was
centred on the candidacy of the emperor. In 1314, the committee of electors of the
Roman Empire held a double election for the crown in Germany, with both
Frederick of Austria and Ludwig of Bavaria vying for the imperial title. It was
Ludwig who was favoured over Frederick, by the majority. This decision however
resulted in a protracted civil war between the rivals, until Ludwig finally emerged
victorious in 1322.
During this period Pope John XXII declared that the emperor requires papal
confirmation before being conferred his title, and thus Ludwig cannot be
recognised as the ruler of Germany. In addition, he argued that the empire was
vacant during the conflict between the rival candidates and that until and unless
Ludwig received papal confirmation he may not reassume royal authority
(Canning, 1988:344). When Ludwig reacted by rejecting these terms, and
continued to rule without papal confirmation he was immediately
excommunicated by the pope in 1324. Ludwig still did not give in. Instead, he
invaded Italy in 1327 to gain the imperial crown by creating a rival pope, the
excommunicate Bishop of Venice (Canning,1988:344). Here, the representatives
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of the people of the city crowned him emperor. Although Ludwig continued in an
effort to foster peace with John XXII and his successors Clement VI and Benedict
XII, he met with no success. During this period, one of Ludwig's principal
advisers was Marsilius ofPadua who actively supported him in his conflict with
the papacy, and accompanied him on his invasion of Italy (Canning, 1996: 154).
The Defender ofPeace (1324) was also completed and made public in this time. It
is against this backdrop of papal versus secular conflict, and the knowledge of
Marsilius's historical involvement in this conflict, that we can now assess
Marsilius's work.
Mm'silius and territorial sovereignty
In the discussion that follows I will make evident that Marsilius does indeed
express the idea of sovereignty in his political thought. However, before I delve
into the specific philosophical issues of this conceptual argument I shall begin by
providing an interesting entry point to locate this discussion into the broader
framework of my inquiry, which is whether from a purely conceptual standpoint
this sovereignty expresses territorial implications. I note at the outset that to claim
an argument of territorial sovereignty from Marsilius's thought as compared to
Baldus's is slightly more complicated precisely because of what Ullmann
describes as the manner in which sovereignty is 'personalised' in the Defender of
Peace (Ullmann,1988:397).2 I will thus formulate my arguments in light of
Ullmann's claims.
Ullmann argues that in Marsilius' s conception of sovereignty, there is a
'considerable vagueness' surrounding the issue of territoriality, with no explicit
declaration of the physical extent to which his sovereignty is enforceable
(Ullmann, 1988:400):
The absence of mentioning of a territory or of a consideration of space in
the exercise ofjurisdiction or of any contemplation of locality in
Marsilius's tract makes abundantly clear that this postulate of a reification
2 See Waiter Ullmann's 'Personality and Territoriality in the Defensor Pacis' (1988) pg 397-400
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of sovereignty did not form part of his thought process (Ullmann,
1988:401)
In this regard Ullmann believes that Marsilius expresses a more subjectivised
sovereignty which is neither territorially anchored nor indicative of any territorial
connexion. Let me now assess this first part of Ullman' s claim. It is apparent that
if we are to accept Ullmann' s argument above, any claim of territorial sovereignty
from Marsilius's writings is significantly undermined. However, is what Ullmann
saying completely true? Can we declare that Marsilius in all his perception and
insight blatantly disregarded the issue of territory as important? An answer to this
in my view would entail a mixed response, one that would accept some of what
Ullmann is saying, but reject the rest. I will thus attempt to illustrate what I mean
below.
In order to understand the notion of territory in relation to state sovereignty one
needs to revisit what sovereignty means. It is widely held in political thought that
sovereignty by definition means supreme authority within a territory. In any notion
of sovereignty, whether expressed directly or indirectly, territoriality is therefore
implicit. Equally 'historical manifestations of sovereignty are almost always
specific instances of this general definition' (Mclean, 1996:464). In this way, I
argue that the notion of territory is implicit in Marsilius's notion of sovereignty.
An example of Marsilius's implicit use of territory is evident in his argument for
state coercion:
And since this guardian must restrain those who unjustly exceed the
standard, as well as other individuals from within and without who trouble
or try to oppress the community, the state (civitas) had to have some
element within itself whereby it might resist these people (Marsilius [1324]
2005:26).
Here, Marsilius makes an implicit reference to the notion of territory. This is
because in order for any coercive force to function it has to be effective within a
specified territory.
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However Ullmann is probably right in arguing that Marsilius's notion of
sovereignty did not emphasise territoriality in any detail. A possible answer for
this as Ullmann suggests lies in the purpose of his writing the tract:
Peace was disturbed by the claims ofjurisdiction made and largely
exercised by the papacy and the law which it administered, based as it was
on an interpretation of the Bible which he rejected... the target of attack
was the ecclesiological system as it presented itself to him... the absence of
the territorial component part of sovereignty can be explained by his all too
closely following ecclesiological footsteps (Ullmann, 1988:407)
Ullmann's argument is a valid one. The church in both its origin and history had
no terrestrial boundaries; it was a universal body, and borders were of no real
concern to it. In other words, the very concept of territory was meaningless within
ecclesiological foundations. Marsilius in an effort to replace the claims of
universal coercive sovereignty of the papacy tries to put forward his own theory of
the state. But as Ullmann correctly points out, by following ecclesiological
footsteps, where territory is not a major issue, Marsilius may have neglected to
make territoriality, in his conception of sovereignty, a major issue. Nonetheless, I
do not believe as Ullmann does, that Marsilius may have neglected the issue of
territoriality completely. I will once again use the notion of security to justify my
conceptual argument.
For Marsilius, the issue of peace and tranquillity was of real concern. The major
part of his writing is focused on achieving this end ofpeace. The issue of peace
and tranquillity presented major problems in Marsilius's city-state republic of
Padua, where despite its defacto jurisdiction coercive authority was assumed by
more than one player: 'the politics of city-states were constantly affected by the
rival claims of empire and papacy to ultimate universal sovereignty in the region'
(Brett, 2005:xiii). Marsilius recognised these problems and in the Defender of
Peace tries theoretically to remedy them. As we have seen already, central to
Marsilius's construction of the state is the well-functioning nature of its parts.
These parts are integral to man achieving the sufficient life. When instituting these
parts of the state, Marsilius deems it necessary to establish a 'military' office:
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For the rest, given that the sufficient life could not be led if the citizens
were oppressed or reduced to slavery by external enemies; again, given that
the sentences ofjudges on internal miscreants and rebels must be carried
out by means of coercive force; it was necessary to institute within the state
a military or defensive part ...For the state is established for the purpose of
living and living well ... but this is impossible if the citizens are reduced to
servitude (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 26)
But why does Marsilius do this? The answer in my view lies in territorial
sovereignty. Marsilius considered it necessary for a state to protect its borders.
Security, as I have mentioned throughout this project, is central to the notion of
territorial sovereignty. As Gottmann (1973:14) argues state territorial sovereignty
may well be described as endowed with one main function: 'to serve as a shelter
for security'. Marsilius believed that security for citizens was one of the prime
objectives of the state, thus regarding the establishment of a military part of the
state as part of achieving that objective. In this way, I would disagree with
Ullmann that Marsilius's conception of sovereignty disregarded territory. Instead
it is more fair to say as I have expressed above, that territory is implicit in his
understanding of sovereignty, and to accept Ullmann's argument of the reason
why Marsilius unlike Baldus did not deal with it in an explicit and overt sort of
way. Having laid down these critical observations, it is now easier to explore
Marsilius's contribution to the idea of territorial sovereignty in the late Middle
Ages. Hence, I now turn to the philosophical dimensions of his argument.
Mm'silius: on tranquillity or intranquillity in the city or state
As a way of introducing us to the subject of his book, Marsilius begins by stating
that the sufficient life is the 'greatest of all human goods' and is therefore what all
human beings aspire to (Marslius [1324] 2005:3). But this sufficient life can only
truly be achieved if civil regimes can provide peace and tranquillity, and men are
at peace with each other. But because this is not always achievable, and 'contraries
of themselves produce contraries', then discord or the opposite of tranquillity is
often an inevitable outcome, which produces the 'worst of fruits in civil regimes'
(Marsilius [1324] 2005:3).
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This sense of discord is evident when one examines the history of the Roman
Empire. According to Marsilius, when the inhabitants of Rome 'lived together
peaceably', they benefited from the fruits of tranquillity. Peace was so beneficial
and progressive, that it had far-reaching effects: the empire 'subjected to
themselves the entire habitable world' (Marsilius [1324] 2005:4). In the same way,
when 'discord and strife arose among them', the entire civil regime was troubled,
and the empire was 'subjected to the sway of hated foreign nations' (Marsilius
[1324] 2005: 4). Marsilius believes that this is exactly what is happening in the
parts of Italy that were once part of the ancient empire. It is once again 'tom apart
on all sides because of strife' and can easily be invaded by 'anyone with the will
and power to occupy it' (Marsilius [1324] 2005:4).
Marsilius believes that while Aristotle in his Politics attempts to detect and explain
the causes of civil strife, he did not know about one pervasive and destructive
cause, the papal desire for power and universal sovereignty:
... still there neve11heless exists ... one singular and well-hidden
cause ...This cause is highly contagious, and equally liable to spread over
all other civil orders and realms, and has already, in its rapacity, tried to
invade most of them... For it is, and was, a certain perverted opinion, which
we shall unfold in what follows; assumed by way of occasion from a
miraculous effect produced by the supreme cause, long after the time of
Aristotle, beyond the possibilities of inferior nature and the usual action of
causes in thing... wearing the mask of the honourable and the beneficial
(Marsilius [1324) 2005: 5-6).
Now, Marsilius considers rhetorically that since we have established that the fruits
ofpeace and tranquillity are much more beneficial than those of its contrary, strife,
we should pursue peace with all imaginable human effort. To do this, Marsilius
argues, our sense of duty towards ensuring we achieve peace, both on an
individual and collective level, should be guided by the feeling of 'heavenly
charity' as well as the' bond or right of human society' (Marsilius [1324] 2005:6).
It is considered that here Marsilius is referring to two religious traditions common
to the medieval experience: 'the Christian obligation of charity to neighbours as
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expressed in the evangelical law of perfect liberty of the gospel' and 'the Roman
tradition of ius gentium or law of nations' (Coleman, 1999:141). One can assume
that for the medieval reader who is assessing how man is to achieve the common
good in society, both of these points would convey a certain resonance.
Furthermore, as I have already pointed out in previous chapters, the impact of
Roman law and the ius gentium in particular was considerable in theoretical
writing as it had a wide-ranging and extensive applicability.
To further entrench his point on the need for man to strive in achieving the
common good, Marsilius cites Cicero who says: 'We are not born for ourselves
alone: our country claims for itself one part of our birth, and our friends another'
(Marsilius [1324] 2005:6). This statement is followed by another invocation of the
issue of the common good as Marsilius argues that we ought to follow nature by
endeavouring to attain the common good. In this regard, it is necessary and
important that we put an end to the false logic or 'sophism' which argues that the
church's intervention in the temporal affairs of society will see to it that the
common good is achieved. Ifwe continue to subscribe to this idea, which plagues
and threatens our communities it will bring unimaginable harm to all states and
civil orders.
Marsilius then attempts to analyse closely the contraries tranquillity or
intranquillity in the city or state (civitas aut regnum). He argues that since we are
aware that these characteristics of tranquillity and intranquillity are characteristics
of the city or state at different intervals, it is perhaps worth exploring what is
meant by the city (civitas) or state (regnum) first.
To avoid, as Marsilius puts it the 'ambiguity which arises from a multiplicity of
terms', he begins first by defining the word state (regnum) (Marsilius [1324]
2005: 11). This term according to Marsilius has a variety of connotative meanings.
The first of these 'implies a plurality of cities or provinces contained under one
regime' (Marsilius [1324] 2005:11). This definition of the state is a territorially
descriptive one, telling us that a regnum can simply be a number of cities or
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provinces that are in the jurisdiction of a single authority. The second way in
which regnum can be understood for Marsilius is as a 'particular type of polity or
temperate regime, which Aristotle calls temperate monarchy' (Marsilius [1324]
2005: 11). Here, Marsilius is referring to the regnum as that which can be found in
a single city or in many cities, in whichever case, each city was under a specific
type of temperate regime. An example, which Marsilius cites, is the early civil
community where in most cases there existed 'one single king in each single city'
(Marsilius [1324] 2005: 12).
In its third manifestation, a regnum according to Marsilius is merely a
combination of the first and second types. Here Marsilius is referring to the state,
which was most familiar in his day, a mixture of territorial and temperate
monarchy elements. Still, it is Marsilius's last definition of regnum, which is most
interesting for our discussion.
Marsilius introduces a fourth understanding of the term regnum, one which he
prefers most: regnum is that where there exists 'something common to every type
of temperate regime, whether in a single city or in several cities ...we too shall use
the term in determining the answers to our questions' (Marsilius [1324] 2005:12).
This definition of regnum or state is particularly relevant to this enquiry, as toward
the end of this discussion, I will demonstrate how Marsilius used the concept of
sovereignty invested in the corporation of people, or citizens, as the 'common
something' that is shared by all types of states. This argument views the idea of
sovereignty, 'in any regime that is ruled over by one, few or many' as that which
will always be with the citizen or people, as it is the will of the people that is
'represented by the one, few or many' (Coleman, 1999: 142).
Marsilius now shifts back to his initial question on defining more closely
tranquillity and its opposite. This time he employs a figurative analogy, which
compares the regnwn or state with an animal or its animate nature. The state he
argues, is 'like' an animal which according to its natural disposition is 'composed
of certain proportionate parts' which are not only arranged in the most correct and
ordered manner, but are capable of 'communicating their actions between
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themselves' to ensure the correct functioning of the whole (Marsilius [1324] 2005
:12). In Marsilius's analogy, the main difference between the animal and state, is
that the animal and its parts are 'established in accordance with nature', whereas
the state and its parts are created and maintained by reason (Marsilius [1324]
2005: 12).
Marsilius argues that the relation between the animal and its parts, to health, is
similar to the relation between the state and its parts, to tranquillity. Such
reasoning, he believes, has one main 'inference on the basis of what everyone
understands about both' (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 12). This is, that as, according to
nature, the most favourable condition for the animal is health, then too, according
to reason, the most favourable condition for the state is tranquillity. Marsilius
argues that in the case of the animal, this can be confirmed by an 'expert
physician' who would define health as: 'that good condition of an animal, in
which each of its parts is enabled perfectly to perform the operations appropriate
to its nature (Marsilius [1324] 2005:12-13). Based on this, Marsilius believes that
if we were to define tranquillity, it would be that optimal condition of the city or
state, in which all of its parts are functioning perfectly as maintained by reason.
On this, a point to note, is that the state, unlike the animal (whose healthy
disposition and well-functioning is not rationally guided), requires a sense of
consciousness and 'rational effort' to ensure it maintains tranquillity (Coleman,
1999:142).
Marsilius now attempts to define intranquillity as the logical contrary to
tranquillity. His response is based on what he has defined as tranquillity already,
arguing that' any good definition signifies at the same time the contraries of what
is being defined' (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 13). Hence, intranquillity is simply the
bad or unhealthy condition of the state, in which all or some of the parts of the
state are impeded in fully achieving what it is optimally designed to do. At this
point, Marsilius is satisfied with his figurative explanation of the terms tranquillity
and intranquillity, and now attempts to explore what the state is in itself and what
it exists for.
66
On the origins ofthe civil community
Before developing his idea of what the state is in itself and what it exists for (as it
is the perfect community), Marsilius sought to first introduce the origins of the
civil community and its way of living. Of this Marsilius states:
And men are not judged to know any particular thing unless they know it
together with its primary causes and its first principles right down to its
elements (Marsilius [1324] 2005:14).
This notion of deriving knowledge from a first principle approach is a typically
Aristotelian idea (see Brett in Marsilius, 2005:14). Marsilius believes that the
evolution of the civil community from an imperfect to a more perfect sort has been
a natural, historical progression. Civil communities at various moments of time
and place have started out as small entities, gradually developing into something
greater. This progression towards perfection, argues Marsilius, is the course of
'every action of nature or art' (Marsilius [1324] 2005:15). The civil community is
no different in Marsilius's view. Starting out as the basic 'minimum human
combination' of male and female, it gradually increased until it 'filled one
household' (Marsilius [1324] 2005, 5). Through the process of procreation, this
multiplied until the establishment of several households, which can be
characterised as the first village or community.
Marsilius makes a very pertinent point, when he considers how actions were
regulated in the single household and first communities. This suggests that
Marsilius is very aware of human nature and the need for authority in even the
smallest community; an argument that he would later use to detem1ine the need for
sovereign authority in the perfect community or state. Of course, the fact that
Aristotle deals with these arguments on primitive kingship in Politics I should also
be taken into consideration (Marsilius [1324],2005: 143). According to Marsilius,
then, when human beings were in a single household, their actions were regulated
by an elder. Similarly, when they formed the first community or village, their
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actions were regulated as well, albeit in a slightly different manner. Where in the
case of the single household, the elder would be able to 'punish domestic
wrongdoings entirely at his wish and pleasure', such a course of action would be
entirely inappropriate, or in the Marsilian term not 'licit' for him as the 'chief of
the first community' (Marsilius [1324] 2005:16).
The head of the community would thus have to implement order and justice
through a 'general ordinance of reason or quasi-natural law' (Marsilius [1324]
2005: 16). The question is how does the elder acquire this sense of reason?
Marsilius believes that attaining a sense ofjustice and rationality is not something
one is able to learn, or enquire about. Rather it is a 'common dictate of reason'
known to all man, coupled with a 'duty for human society' (Marsilius [1324]
2005,16). Thus Marsilius argues that the function of rule in the earliest
communities was guided by a sense ofjustice and concern for human society and
by the common dictate of reason known to all men. Unlike the early households,
'arbitrary rule' was replaced by an 'implicit appeal to a commonly held rational
dictate that equity must be done to all for the sake of the common good... a quasi-
natural law' (Coleman, 1999: 143).
Up to this stage, Marsilius has delineated the origin of the civil community. Now,
he discusses the movement away from early imperfect communities to a more
perfect way of living in the state:
As these communities gradually increased, human experience increased
likewise, and more perfect arts and rules of living were discovered while
the parts of the communities were also differentiated further (Marsilius
[1324] 2005: 17) .
Here Marsilius makes an implicit reference to the issue of territory in relation to
the state. The increase of communities he speaks of denotes the growth in the size
of political spaces, principally reflected through territory. Within a larger populus
and territorial space, we witness the acquiring of more perfect rules of living and
fuliher differentiation. This leads us to the path of the perfect community or state.
This is Marsilius's way of leading us to the state, where man through 'reason and
68
experience' is able to deal with the' differentiation of its parts' in a more
sophisticated manner (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 17).
On the pe1fect community or state and the division ofits parts
By way of introducing us to the state, and the issue of the differentiation of its
parts, Marsilius cites Aristotle's definition of the state: 'a perfect community
possessing every limit of self-sufficiency, as it is consequent to say, having thus
come about for the sake of living, but existing for the sake ofliving well'
(Marsilius [1324] 2005: 18). This definition conveys two main ideas. The first of
these is that the central aim for those living in a state should not just be to live as
ordinary 'beasts and slaves' do, but to live well. The second concerns what it
means to live well: 'having leisure for the liberal activities that result for the
virtues both of the practical and theoretical soul' (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 18).
Marsilius thus incorporates this definition into his theoretical account, by
accepting the Aristotelian view that sees the state as existing for the final and
perfect cause of living well. Here, he specifically argues that 'moral and
intellectual virtues' must be engaged in an 'extraordinarily active way' (Coleman,
1999: 145). This method will make certain that all requirements of the civil life are
met, and is not just about a satisfactory material existence. His precise purpose is
to use this understanding of living well as a fundamental or basic principle of what
he is going to demonstrate. Thus Marsilius presents us with this first premise:
A principle naturally held and believed and freely conceded by all ... that all
men not deficient or otherwise impeded, naturally desire a sufficient life,
and by the same token shun and avoid those things that are harmful to them
(Marsilius [1324] 2005: 18).
Marsilius believes that there are two modes in which human beings can achieve
their purpose ofliving-well. The first is in the 'temporal' or 'worldly' realm, and
the second is in the 'eternal or heavenly' realm (Marsilius [1324] 2005:19). Of the
former, it is the philosophers who have made absolute sense of the subject. But
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there are two reasons, according to Marsilius, why political society is fundamental
to a satisfactory human life (see Black, 1992:63):
And although the experience of the senses teaches us this, we nonetheless
wish to introduce the cause we spoke of with greater definition, and say
that because man is by nature composed of contrary elements, and as a
result of their contrary actions and passions is almost continually losing
something of his substance; and again, because he is born naked and
undefended against the excesses of the air which surrounds him, and of the
other elements - passible and corruptible, as they say in natural science;
therefore he stood in need of arts of different kinds and types in order to
resist the said damage (Marsilius, [1324] 2005: 19-20).
Marsilius presents us with two very plausible reasons why we require a political
society to achieve the end of living well. The first reason that Marsilius provides
us is with regards man's actual abilities. On this, Marsilius argues that human
beings are born without any skills, 'naked and unarmed', and are consequently
defenceless in the community. They are dependent on the availability of a large
and diverse set of skills or arts, which would allow them to defend themselves
against harm. These arts could only be made available in a community with a
'large number of men', who through their mutual consent, 'gather together to
secure the advantage to be had from them and to avoid disadvantage' (Marsilius
[1324] 2005:20).
The second reason Marsilius provides concerns the nature of human beings who,
according to Marsilius are made up of 'contrary elements' and are thus continually
'losing something of their substance'. Here Marsilius goes further than Aristotle,
when he recognises that when men are brought together, there is a potential for
discord, argument and quarrel. And because dispute is inevitable in this scenario,
Marsilius believes that it is necessary to 'institute within this community a
standard ofjustice and guardian executor of it' (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 20).
Implementing a regulatory force, or standard ofjustice, is of paramount
importance in such a setting, as fighting will cause the disunity and separation of
people. This would severely jeopardise the perfect community, ultimately leading
to what Marsilius believes is the destruction of the state (Marsilius [1324]
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2005:20). It is interesting to contrast this Marsilian view of man's contrary nature
with Hobbes notion of a self-interested man in the state of nature, who is most
certain to encounter 'quarrel' leading to a 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short'
existence (Hobbes, 1991: pg 80-90). Both these scenarios of man are applied in
the development of the idea of the state.
Marsilius develops this argument further when he introduces the need for state
coerCIOn:
And since this guardian must restrain those who unjustly exceed the
standard, as well as other individuals from within and without who trouble
or try to oppress the community, the state (civitas) had to have some
element within itself whereby it might resist these people (Marsilius [1324]
2005:26).
It, is my view that here Marsilius is producing a theory of coercive power in state
or perfect political community, by arguing that there must be some means of
resisting people who exist in or out of the state. It would be correct to state that
that Marsilius is referring to the notion of a 'police force or army' (see Black,
1992:63). This is also another instance of Marsilius's implicit use of the idea of
territory. In order for a coercive force to function it has to be effective within a
specified territory. This is an idea he builds on later, when he seeks to differentiate
the parts of the state, and identifies a 'military or defensive part', which acts as the
coercive force in the territorially sovereign state. In addition, this fits well into
Marsilius's project of destroying papal claims to coercive power and transferring it
to the sovereign. Some have even described this issue of coercion as Marsilius's
prime contention of the Defender ofPeace, 'that coercive jurisdictional power was
in the wrong hands' (see Canning, 1999:2005).
Marsilius then reiterates his earlier point of the state's need to acquire certain
common goods:
Again, since the city stands in need of certain supplies, repairs and stores of
various common goods (and these differ in time of peace or war) it was
necessary that it should contain people to provide such things, so that the
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common need could be met whenever it was expedient or required
(Marsilius [1324] 2005: 20).
Marsilius makes an important point here, when he recognises the state, or perfect
community as functioning for the common good. For him, men who are gathered
together with the sole purpose of living the sufficient life are able not only to
'obtain for themselves' their 'necessities', but to share also in the common good
(Marsilius [1324]: 2005:21). This gathering of people, epitomised by perfection,
the limit of self-sufficiency, and regulated by a guardian who serves justice that
achieves the common good, is called the state.
Marsilius does not stop here. In fact this is why his theory of state sovereignty
cannot be considered a mere 'secular, utility calculation' (Coleman, 1999:146).
Instead Marsilius states:
But beyond the things just mentioned, which meet the needs of this present
life alone, there is something else which those who share a civil community
need for the status of the world to come, promised to the human race
through the supernatural revelation of God; and which is also useful for the
status of this present life: the worship and honouring of God, and the giving
of thanks both for blessings received in this world and those to be received
in the future world as well (Marsilius [1324],2005:20).
In the above, Marsilius recognises the role of religion in the present life of the
perfect community. The need for worshipping and honouring God is a self-evident
human need. Thus, the state appoints 'certain teachers' to 'guide men' in the
present life. Such an understanding stems from the medieval idea of the eternal
good life, which as Marsilius admits, although promised to man through
revelation, can only be achieved through the worshipping and honouring of God.
Thus it is evident already that Marisilus's understanding of religion and the state
so far is that of the state delegating or appointing teachers to offer guidance to man
in his spiritual pursuits, This will be confirmed later on in this discussion, when
we will discover how this role is something in stark contrast to that fullness of
power (plenitudo potestas) which the papacy has assumed for itself.
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Of course, Marsilius acknowledges that people who want to live the sufficient life
have 'needs of different kinds', which can only be supplied by a community that
'contains different orders or offices' (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 21). The perfect
community or state was established 'naturally', through 'experience and rational
reflection' , and the differentiation of parts are towards the' functioning' of the
common good (Coleman,1999: 144). He thus attempts to elaborate on these
different orders or offices of men, or what he defines as the 'differentiation and
identification of the parts of the city' (Marsilius [1324] 2005:22).
Now, Marsilius attempts to offer the reader an elucidation of the parts of the state,
so as to clarify further his initial inquiry of the causes of tranquillity and
intranquillity. On this, he identifies the parts or offices of the state in six useful
categories. These are 'agriculture, manufacture, the military, the financial, the
priesthood and the judicial or councillar' (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 22). According
to Marsilius, of these categories, three are in an absolute sense parts of the state.
They are the priesthood, the military and the judicial. The others are only 'called
parts in a broad sense', in that they are offices of the state which are occupied by
the multitude (Marsilius [1324] 2005:22-23). I do not wish to explore and analyse
all of these categories which Marsilius provides. Nonetheless I see fit to explore
the last two, termed the judicial and priestly offices of the state, which are of
particular relevance to this discussion. But first, I will address briefly Marsilius's
main philosophical ideas of the differentiation of these functioning parts.
Marsilius considers the necessity of these parts of the state as 'self-evident',
arguing that that the state is 'established in order that the human beings within it
may live and live well' (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 23). By this stage, we have a clear
sense that Marsilius' s view of living well is the ultimate purpose or aim of man in
the perfect community, and that these different areas of state function are to
enhance the prospect of living well. Yet the question remains: through what means
is man expected to achieve this?
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Marsilius argues that nature provides man with the first level that is the instinct or
desire to live:
And although living in both of its said modes - that which is peculiar to
man as well as that which he has in common with the other animals - is
dependent on natural causes ... that sort of consideration belongs within the
natural science... (Marsilius [1324] 2005:24).
Marsilius believes that through the study of natural science, we can make
complete sense of the way in which natural causes lead both man and animals to
desire the object of living. However, what is of greater importance to his present
inquiry, argues Marsilius, is the second level, or the ways in which man goes
beyond natural causes to accomplish his goal of living well. This according to
Marsilius is achieved through 'reason', and 'art':
If man is to live and live well, his actions must be done and done well, and
not just his actions, but his passions too ... man needed to go beyond natural
causes and use his reason to create those things needed to complete the
production and preservation of his actions and passions of both body and
soul. And these are the different kinds of work and worked objects that
result from the virtues and the arts, both practical and theoretical
(Marsilius[1324] 2005:24).
In the above, Marsilius brings to light an important idea. That is, to live well, man
needs to temper his actions and passions, which can only be achieved by
employing reason and rationally, something that goes beyond the realm of natural
instinct. In other words, some actions or passions are performed by man through
appetitive desire and cognition, and is therefore not an 'instinctive, biological
response to an external condition' (Coleman, 1999: 146-147). Furthermore,
coupled with reason, it is through the arts that man is also able to achieve his
purpose of living well, as once his actions and passions are tempered, man is free
to discover different kinds of arts and virtues. Of course, as mentioned already,
Marsilius believes that there is an important reason why men should practice these
arts, that is, in order that they may 'remedy human need' (Marsilius [1324] 2005:
25)
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On the judicial and priestly offices ofthe state
I will now briefly view how Marsilius deals with the judicial part of the state, as it
is this ruling part that derives its authority 'from, the divine will of the people', or
the human legislator, and is, as we shall later see, instructed 'to institute all the
other five parts' (Black, 1992:64). How then does Marsilius describe this judicial
part and its functions?
In order, however, to moderate the excesses of acts that originate from our
abilities to move in respect of place as a result of cognition and appetite-
which we called 'transitive' , and which can take place either to the
convenience or inconvenience or injury of someone other than the agent for
the status of the world- there was of necessity instituted within the city a
particular part or office through which the excesses of such acts might be
corrected and reduced to equality or due proportion. For otherwise they
would cause fighting and consequently the separation of the citizens, and in
the end the destruction of the city and the loss of sufficient life. This part is
called by Aristotle the judicial or the princely and councillor, together with
the things that minister to it, and it belongs to this part to regulate what is
just and beneficial to the community (Marsilius [1324] 2005 :26)
In the above passage Marsilius reveals both the rationale and function of the
judicial or ruling part of the government. To do this, he begins first, by defining a
particular type of action, which he terms as transitive. But what does Marsilius
mean by the word transitive? In the context in which Marsilius mentions it,
transitive acts refer to those 'actions and passions performed by man as a result of
his knowledge and conscious choices' which affect others around him (Coleman,
1999: 147). Marsilius thus argues that the state itself is essentially preoccupied
with correcting and reducing the effects and consequences of those human actions
which affect others.
According to Marsilius, a state is not meant to question our actions. Instead, it
serves more as a mediator which 'oversees how we act and whether these actions
foster or obstruct the conditions for the achievement of the common good, that is
the tranquillity necessary for the collective sufficient life' (Coleman, 1999:147).
For this, Marsilius envisions the need to institute a specific office of the state that
would deal with the transitive actions or consequences of the people's actions.
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Furthennore, Marsilius reiterates once again that this office is there to avoid the
possibility of fighting and separation of people that would lead to the ruin of the
state. Marsilius believes that it is the judicial or princely part of the state that must
be commissioned with dealing with the ramifications or excesses of transient acts.
These actions must be corrected so as to accomplish equality or due proportion in
the state. The main function of the judicial office is therefore to regulate by
serving justice for the common good. Hence, these transitive acts are fundamental
to his 'vision of the scope oflegitimate political rule' (Coleman, 1999:147).
Marsilius's true aim in creating the priestly office of the state was to argue for the
subordination of the church to one sovereign power, the human legislator. Hence,
from the moment he introduces the need for the priestly office, he brings its
necessity into question, arguing that it is a matter that is neither clear nor easy to
rationally demonstrate:
It remains for us now to say something of the necessity of the priestly part,
concerning which there has been no such general agreement among men as
upon the necessity of the other parts of the city. And the reason for this has
been that its true and primary necessity could not be understood through
demonstration, and neither was the matter clear of itself (Marsilius [1324]
1999:28).
However, as a means ofjustifying his argument Marsilius believes that there is
some historical agreement around the issue of the necessity of the priestly office
within the state. This, according to Marsilius, is the 'worship and honour of God'
and 'the benefit consequent upon these practices for the status of the present world
or of that to come' (Marsilius [1324] 2005:28). Marsilius cites these two reasons
as historically embedded, declaring that they have come to be established as fact,
even though they rely on unseen reality: 'for many religions or followings promise
reward for those who do good, and punishment for evildoers, to be meted out by
God in a future world' (Marsilius [1324] 2005:28). Marsilius argues that this is
something which we believe without it being demonstrated. Marsilius thus turns
his attention to how we can demonstrate the need for a religious element to the
state, a reason which would confinn its benefit to the status of life in this world.
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This reason he argues, is that religions contain a particular degree of moral
advantage:
And this was the goodness of human actions both as individuals and as
citizens; upon which the clam or tranquillity of communities, and
ultimately the sufficient life of this present world, almost wholly depends
(Marsilius [1324] 2005: 28).
I note with interest Marsilius's deep-seated commitment toward religion, a
conviction of which he perceived as positively influential to life in the perfect
community or state. Religion for him supplemented a civil code of law as its moral
virtue and ethics would continue to foster a sense of virtue and goodness. In this
world-view, men would act out of fear and terror avoiding acting in a wrongful
manner and inspired to 'virtuous deeds of piety and mercy', something which
would affect their actions toward themselves and others (Marsilius [1324]
2005:29). Of course, the legislator would not be able to compel man into religious
belief: 'for there are celiain acts that a legislator cannot regulate by human law'
(Marsilius [1324] 2005:29). However, a religious-minded citizen body would
profit the legislator itself, in that men would enjoin good and forbid evil,
motivated by religion only. This would in turn radically reduce the amount of
'disputes and injuries' within the state, and engender 'peace or tranquillity' and
the 'sufficient life of human beings', all of which are evident in the status of this
present world (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 148).
On this, Marsilius ends by clearly stating that the final end or function of the
priestly office of the state is limited to the 'instruction and education of men' on
religious issues arising from 'evangelical law' , so as to guide and help men to
'attain eternal salvation and avoid eternal misery' (Marsilius [1324] 2005; 148).
By doing this, Marsilius makes an important conceptual breakthrough in his theory
of the state. He accords, as with almost every other medieval writer a place for the
Christian church. However, his idea of the role of religion in the state is not
universal, or all-encompassing, deeming what he regards as the rightful and
appropriate place for the Christian church. This is to educate and teach man the
evangelical law.
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This role of the church is something which he considers as demonstrably useful to
worldly life, nothing close to the power that has been claimed by the papacy in
their desire for universal sovereign jurisdiction. Marsilius refines this role even
more when he places the human legislator above the priestly office, so as to ensure
that the church or papacy does not pursue temporal power. More importantly this
is particularly significant when I expound in the remaining discussion his full
theory of state territorial sovereignty, which is something which belongs to only
one coercive power, the human legislator.
On the human legislator and its functions
Marsilius begins his discussion of what is the human legislator by first identifying
what he describes as the causes for the differentiation of the parts of the state. He
argues that nature predisposes different men towards different 'native dispositions'
and that some have:
a suitability and tendency towards agriculture, others toward soldiering,
others to other kinds of crafts and disciplines - but always different people
to different pursuits (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 37)
This inclination of human beings in respect to different functions is directed
toward achieving the purpose of living: the sufficient life in the perfect community
or state. It is nature that has endowed different people with 'different
characteristics suitable for different offices' (Coleman, 1999;149). In this sense,
the offices occupied by different members of the state are established for the
common good. Following from this, Marsilius considers the 'motive or efficient
causes' of all these different offices of the state (Marsilius [1324] 2008: 38). The
idea of efficient cause as expressed by Marsilius is that of an agency which brings
something into existence. Marsilius therefore considers the efficient cause of the
state as:
the minds and wills of men expressed through their thoughts and desires -
either individually or collectively, it makes no matter; and in the case of
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certain offices, the originating principle is additionally the movement and
exercise of bodily members. But their most efficient cause insofar as they
are parts of the city is most often the human legislator, even if on occasion,
rarely and only in a few instances, the immediate motive cause was God
without any human determination (Marsilius[1324] 2005:38-89).
Hence, Marsilius believes that it is the minds and wills of all men, through their
thoughts and desires whether individually and collectively, that constitute the
human legislator of every state. Before the coming of Christ, argues Marsilius, in
some rare cases the direct efficient cause of the state and its offices was God. This
however did not consider any human determination. It is evident that Marsilius
makes this point to show how, after the coming of Christ, it is the human
legislators that would 'now establish the office of Christian priesthood'
(Coleman, 1999: 149).
Marsilius goes on to provide an analogy of the role of the human legislator, as that
which 'institutes, differentiates and separates' the parts of the state 'in the manner
of nature in an animal' (Marsilius [1324] 2005:40). He argues that once the state is
fonned from the perfect community, the human legislator creates the first office or
part of that state. This part is the judicial or princely office, the function and
purpose of which I have described earlier in this discussion. According to
Marsilius, it is after this judicial or ruling part of the state is established, 'the first
of all the rest', that the other offices of the state such as the priestly, financial etc
follow (Marsilius [1324] 2005:40). It is the establishment of this judicial or ruling
part of the state that Marsilius now turns to, providing the reader with greater
clarity with regards to its range of efficacy.
Marsilius distinguishes between two kinds ofjudicial or princely offices. The first
is what he describes as 'well-tempered' and the second is what he tern1S 'flawed':
Together with Aristotle, Politics Ill, chapter 5, I call that kind 'well-
tempered' in which what dominates exercises the function of prince for the
common advantage in accordance with the will of those subject; 'flawed',
that in which this is lacking (Marsilius [1324] 2005:40-41).
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Marsilius differentiates a well-tempered judicial or princely rule (which sets it
apart from a flawed one) according to two distinct factors. These factors are first,
that the ruler or rulers, who regulate the princely office, govern in the spirit of
achieving the common good, and second, that they do so in accordance with the
will of the human legislator. As a way of making us more familiar with what he
means by the idea of flawed and well-tempered, Marsilius provides examples of
what forms both these types of rule are likely to take:
Each of these generic kinds subdivides into three types: the first (se. the
tempered) into royal monarchy, aristocracy, and polity; the second ( sc.the
flawed) into the three opposing species of tyrannical monarchy, oligarchy
and democracy. And each of these specific types has, again, its own
variants, but it is not part of the business in hand to discuss these in any
more detail (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 41).
For Marsilius, then, temperate ruling is more likely to be found where princely
rule takes the form of monarchy, aristocracy and polity, and in its 'diseased
versions', tyrannical monarchy, oligarchy and democracy, the office of princely
rule would most certainly suppress the will of the people and the common good
that comes out of it for 'factional interest' (Coleman, 1999:149). Needless to say,
Marsilius's understanding of these concepts differs somewhat from our modem
conceptualisations. His notion of democracy or polity, for example, is founded to a
great extent on what he concedes 'Aristotle understands' of these 'said species'
(Marsilius [1324] 2005:41). Still, Marsilius is considered to have gone beyond
Aristotle, who in his criterion of well-tempered rule does not make any mention of
the 'willingness of those subjects' (see Brett (2005), Coleman (1999)). It is this
idea of the consent of the people which sets him apart from Aristotle, and other
typically medieval views on sovereignty.
Marsilius on the election ofa principate (ruler) by the human legislator
In what follows, Marsilius considers how exactly the ruling or princely office of
the state is instituted or brought about by the human legislator. Simply, how does a
'community determine whether it will be ruled or regulated by one, few or many'
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(Coleman, 1999: 15). Marsilius argues that if we consider biblical scripture, and
the manner in which the principate of Israel was established, we cannot
demonstrate through argument how it was established, and thus conclude that we
'hold it by simple belief without reasoning' (Marsilius [1324] 2005:44). Yet, in
Marsilus's view, there exists a rational way in which we can understand the
process of instituting the princely or ruling part of the state. This way is something
'which results immediately from the human mind, even if from God as the remote
cause' (Marsilius [1324] 2005:44).
But what does Marsilius mean by this? Marsilius believes that God uses the
human mind as an instrument or agency in which to establish a ruling or princely
office of the state. Furthern10re He (God), grants man the freedom to establish it in
whatever way he pleases, and can be identified from what is 'better or worse for
the polity'(Marsilius [1324] 2005:44). Marsilius is aware that this takes many
methods or forms, and thus sets out to identify, for example, the five ways in
which to institute a kingly monarchy. It is the conclusions that Marsilius draws
from this that I wish to emphasise at this stage, as they are of major relevance to
our discussion.
Of these, the first important point that Marsilius makes is in relation to election:
From all this it is plain - and this will become clear in what follows that the
elected kind of a principate is superior to the non-elected...The mode of
instituting the other types of tempered principate is also, for the most part,
election (or in some instances by lot), without the continued succession of a
line. Flawed principates are for the most part established by fraud, or
violence, or both (Marsilius [1324] 2005:48).
Marsilius's conception of election needs to be scrutinised closely. He argues that
in the perfect community or state, the most superior way of establishing the head
of the princely or ruling office, a principate, is through choice or election by the
people. In this vein, Marsilius argues that the elected principate would rule over
willing subjects, and govern them with laws that are just or plainly in the spirit of
achieving the common good. Marsilius does however consider the alternative or
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the case of a legitimate non-elected ruler. Here, Marsilius is referring to the
common medieval phenomenon of a ruler that is succeeded by heirs, and not one
that is barbaric or tyrannical. On this, Marsilius states:
Ifwithout election by citizens, then this is either because he, or his
predecessors from whom he stemmed, first inhabited the region; or because
he bought the territory and the jurisdiction, or acquired it in a just war or in
any other licit way, e.g. through a gift it made to him in recognition of
some service rendered (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 47).
It is evident that Marsilius does not completely rule out the scenario of a non-
elected ruler. However two points must be considered. The first is that Marsilius
believed that an elected ruler was far superior (the surer standard ofprincipate)
than his non-elected counterpart. For example, Marsilius argued that it is only
through the process of election, that the best leader can be found, and all other
political evils avoided:
.. .if that kind of principate should for some reason become intolerable to
the multitude because of the excessive evil of its regime, the multitude
must then have recourse to election. For election can never fail, so long as
the human race does not. Furthermore, it is only through this mode of
institution that the best prince can be had. For it is appropriate that he
should be the best of those who are versed in the polity, since he must
regulate the civil actions of all the others (Marsilius [1324] 2005:48).
The second point is that Marsilius places the choice of the possibility of an elected
or non-elected ruler for the state firmly in the hands of the human legislator. Thus
the human legislator could choose the option of instituting a ruler (principate) by
non-election, for example such as a hereditary royal monarch. Whatever the case,
for Marsilius, as long as the human legislator decides it, it should be considered
'rule over the willing' (Marsilius [1324] 2005:48). Now, having established that
the efficient cause of the ruler (principate) is none other than the human legislator,
and that it is through election (a superior way) by the human legislator that such a
ruler (principate) may be instituted, Marsilius attempts to consider more closely
how exactly a ruler (principate) would be able to carry out his main function as a
regulator. And this is what he now turns to.
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Marsilius on the meaning oflaw (lex)
According to Marsilius, in all temperate states it is the function of the ruler
(principate) to 'regulate human civil acts' according to a 'standard that is and
should be the form ofthat which exercises it' (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 51). By this
Marsilius refers to a system in which the ruler may regulate efficiently and in
accordance with the common good. This standard is something Marsilius
identifies as 'law' (lex), something which exists in the perfect community or state:
We suppose, then - as a thing almost self-evident by induction - that this
standard, which is called 'statute' or 'custom' or by common term of 'law',
exists in all perfect communities. Taking this as a given, we shall first show
what it is (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 51).
Marsilius now turns to the myriad of meanings and significations typically
associated with the term 'law'. These meanings vary according to the
interpretations of members who belong to specific disciplines. For example,
Marsilius considers the first meaning oflaw, as a natural science interpretation.
Here, law is simply a 'natural inclination of the sense towards some action or
passion' (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 52). Similarly, Marsilius considers the
philosophical and religious significations of the term 'law'. Whereas of the former
it is any trained capacity for a work of art, of the latter it is a set of rules containing
admonitions for acts which order glory or punishment in the hereafter. However, it
is Marsilius's fourth signification of the term 'law', which he chooses to develop
further and which is at the centre of his inquiry:
Fourthly, however, and in a more widespread sense, this term 'law' implies
a science or doctrine or universal judgement of those things that are just
and advantageous in terms of the city, and their opposites (Marsilius [1324]
2005:53).
Marsilius argues that the implications of the above signification of the term 'law'
twofold. First, it could simply be interpreted in itself, as a universal judgment of
matters of'civil justice and benefit', demonstrating what is just or unjust,
beneficial or harmful. This is what' Justinian described as a science or doctrine of
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right, iurisprudentia' (Coleman, 1999:151). Second, it can be considered as a
coercive command: 'by means of penalty or reward meted out in his world'
(Marsilius [1324] 2005: 53). Marsilius believes that this is the truest sense in
which we can describe the term law. This second implication is indeed of major
theoretical importance, and is something I wish to discuss in more detail below.
It is commonly believed that Marsilius's definition of law, and the theory which he
develops from it, denotes a clear conceptual break from that of Aristotle and other
medieval writers (Ebenstein, 2000:266). The general trend within medieval
political thought was that writers assumed law to be intricately connected to
reason and the common good. 3 Thus, Marsilius's 'emphasis on command as the
constitutive element of law', is something quite 'unusual' in the medieval period
(Canning, 1999: 155). Furthermore, this conception of law as a 'coercive' precept
that demands that actions will be rewarded or punished in the present life is in line
with Marsilius's project, as it removes from the church any powers of sovereignty
or coerCIOn.
Marsilius thus attempts to develop his theory of law:
A law, then, is a 'speech' (or a pronouncement) 'from a certain' (sc.
political) 'prudence and understanding', i.e. an 'ordinance concerning the
just and the beneficial and their opposites, arrived at through political
prudence' and' having coercive power', i.e. that a command has been
given in respect of its observation which an individual is forced to observe,
or that it has been enacted by way of such a command (Marsilius [1324]
2005: 530).
Marsilius argues that law is in effect a statement that comes to being as a result of
careful discretion and political understanding. Simply, a coercive command is a
necessary requirement for the enactment of any law. This idea does not suggest
that Marsilius views law as a mere expression of coercive power. In other words,
for Marsilius, 'human law' was not simply 'an exercise of coercive power in an
arbitrary way' (Canning, 1999:29). Marsilius clearly illustrates this idea, in what is
3 See St Thomas Aquinas for example, who argues that 'law is an ordinance of reason for the common
good' (Cambridge:1998)
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considered as one of the most important passages of the Defender ofPeace (see
Coleman (1999) Black (1992) Canning (1999)):
On the contrary, sometimes a false cognisance of things that are just and
advantageous becomes law, when a command to observe it is given or it is
delivered by way of command. We see this in the lands of some barbarians
who cause it to be observed, as a just thing, that a murderer be absolved
from civil guilt and penalty if he offers some price in goods for this
offence, when however this is simply speaking unjust; and in consequence
their laws are not unqualifiedly perfect. For allowing that they have the
required form, viz. a coercive command that they be observed, they
nonetheless lack the required condition, viz. the requisite true ordinance of
what is just (Marsilius [1324], 2005: 54)
In the above, Marsilius clearly delineates between justice as that which arises from
a proper and con-ect reasoning of what is beneficial, and law which is simply a
coercive command. He thus argues that imperfect laws arise when there is no
'concord between justice as con-ect cognition, right reason, and law as coercive
command' (Coleman, 1999:151). He provides a telling example of what he means
by this, when he describes the laws of barbarian kingdoms. In such places
Marsilius believes that there is a false cognition of what is good and beneficial,
leading to the creation of unjust laws which would for example permit payment in
return for absolution from crimes such as murder. Hence Marsilius argues that the
element of law as a coercive command is not the only necessary condition that is
needed for what may constitute the definition of what is law. Many laws which
observe the command to coerce are still imperfect in the sense that they lack a
fundamental element, which is ordering that which is just.
Mal'silius on the necessity oflaw
In Marsilius's explication of law so far, he has provided an understanding of what
law in its most proper sense may constitute, his key idea being that law is a
coercive precept, and a standard of human civil acts that achieves justice and the
common good. Now, Marsilius turns to the subject of the necessity of making
laws, as exercising laws are something fundamental in the rule of any principate
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(ruler). Marsilius notes that we have already identified the 'principal necessity of
law', that being 'civil justice' and achieving the common good (Marsilius [1324]
2005: 56). However, Marsilius argues that there is a 'secondary necessity' to law
and this is 'security for those in the position ofprince' (Marsilius [1324] 2005:
56). Marsilius elaborates further and in much detail on both these necessary
functions of law, arguing that for both these reasons the ruler (principate) must
rule according to law. I will consider briefly what arguments Marsilius uses to
support the necessity of making laws.
The first necessity of law that Marsilius outlines concerns civil judgement. Here,
he argues that it is 'necessary to institute within a polity that without which civil
judgements cannot be made' (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 56). What does Marsilius
mean by this? According to Marsilius, if civil judgements concerning citizens of
the state are made without the framework of a law, they will not be made
correctly. On the other hand, with the framework of a law present in the state, civil
judgements have a greater ability to be just and fair in their rulings. Thus
Marsilius describes civil judgements guided by law, as free from 'defect insofar as
this is possible for human acts' (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 56). Furthermore, a ruler
is directed by the law to make civil judgments in accordance with the common
good. Marsilius argues that such a premise, that is the necessity of instituting law
within a polity, does not need extensive demonstration as it is 'self-evident' or
something that is intrinsically known to all men.
Marsilius believes that since it is perfectly possible for emotions to direct civil
judgements thus tainting their ability to accord justice, no civil judgement should
be left to the decision-making of an arbitrary person. It is the medium of the law
which allows all judgements to be rid of 'perverted affection.. .like hate or love or
avarice' (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 152). In fact judgement should not even be 'left
to the discretion of the judge', who may be influenced by external factors. It
should instead be 'defined in law and pronounced in accordance with it' (Marsilius
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[1324] 2005:57).4 Further to this, Marsilius makes an important point on the
historical significance of legislation. He argues that since acts of legislation need
prudence and good sense, which cannot be achieved by the collective experiences
of anyone person law should be laid down in respect of the 'understanding it
forged from the understanding of many' over a long period of time (Marsilius
[1324] 2005:60). Thus the necessity of law cannot be brought into question if one
considers it to be an art perfected through the wise and useful experiences of
others over a long period of time.
Now, Marsilius considers the second necessity of law, which is that rulers should
also be regulated and limited by the law:
It is more expedient for those who exercise the function of prince to be
regulated and limited by law, rather than pass civil judgements at their own
discretion; for by following this law they will not do anything wrong or
reprehensible, and as a result their principate will be made more secure and
long-lasting (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 63)
Marsilius justifies his argument ofthe necessity of the principate (ruler) to be
regulated by law in two ways. The first is that Marsilius is cognisant that every
ruler (principate) is bound to possess some weakness or fallibility which would
mar his discretionary powers. Thus, instead of allowing defects in civil judgments
to arise on account of these fallibilities, Marsilius argues that it is important that
even the ruler be regulated by the law, so as to avoid actions that would invoke
turmoil or disorder. Marsilius does acknowledge that one could argue against this
idea on the grounds that there might exist the possibility of the perfect ruler. Here
Marsilius uses the Aristotelian defence, replying that the perfect man is indeed a
rare commodity, and it would thus be safer for civil judgements to be regulated by
law (which is after all the product of collective insight and wisdom) rather than
the 'discretion of a judge, however virtuous' (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 62-63).
4 On this, Marsilius draws from Cicero's De inventione which argued that 'no single man and perhaps
not even all the men of one era could investigate or remember all the civil acts determined in the law'
(see Coleman, 1999: 152).
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Connected to this, Marsilius presents a second justification for the regulation of
the ruler (principate) by the law. Marsilius observes that if rulers are regulated
both in themselves and towards their subjects, one can be certain that they would
suffer less incitement of rebellion, and would consequently maintain a more
permanent and secure government. This justification is interesting if one considers
Marsilius's overarching theme of achieving peace and tranquillity in the perfect
community or state. It is clear in my view that Marsilius endeavours to consider all
the possible permutations of maintaining peace in his construction of the state.
Further to this, his claims of the necessity of the regulation of the ruler by law
facilitate the next major stage of his discussion, which is to accord to the human
legislator the authority to will the laws most appropriate for the state.
Mm'silius on the efficient cause oflaw, the human legislator
Throughout this discussion Marsilius has referred to the concept of 'efficient
cause', which I have simplified to mean the agent that brings something into
existence. Marsilius returns once again to the concept of 'efficient cause' with
regards to law:
For I do not intend here to identify the mode of institution that can come
about, or has already existed... but only of that mode of establishing laws
and principates which results directly from a decision of the human mind
(Marsilius [1324] 2005: 65)
Marsilius begins by describing how this efficient cause may be demonstrated. He
argues that every citizen is capable of discovering the law, if we consider law in a
limited sense, that is, as the' science of what is just and advantageous' (Marsilius
[1324] 2005: 66). Law as understood in this sense is accessible to all citizens and
can consequently be discovered and studied. In fact, it is possible for citizens who
have the time at their leisure, and are also older, wiser and more experienced, to
observe the law fairly adequately.
But Marsilius argues that this meaning of the term law, as simply that which is just
and advantageous, is not law in its proper signification. Rather, as expressed to the
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reader earlier, law is a coercive precept that is necessary for achieving the
common good: 'unless either a coercive command has been given in respect of its
observation' (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 66). In light ofthis reasoning one can
understand why for Marsilius it very important to conceive of the most appropriate
efficient cause with regards to law. This is because at the practical level, this
would constitute assigning the role of law-making to a political authority.
Moreover, since the fundamental purpose of the law is to establish coercive
commands, it is vital that those who make laws do so in respect of achieving the
common good, or else laws would provoke oppression and tyranny. Marsilius
thus identifies the human legislator as the efficient cause or authority with whom
rests the task of making laws:
It is therefore appropriate for us to make clear what individual or
individuals have the authority to give such a command and to constrain
those who transgress it; and this is to inquire into the legislator or the
lawmaker (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 66).
An inquiJy into the human legislator
It is apparent thus far in my discussion that Marsilius has placed much emphasis
on the importance of the human legislator. First he described it as the authority
responsible for instituting the ruler (principate). Next, Marsilius described the
efficient cause of law (lex) in the perfect community or state as the human
legislator. In what I have expressed so far, no mention has been made about what
this may constitute. On the election of the ruler for example, Marsilius referred to
the consent of subjects (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 47). Therefore, what I now wish to
define more closely is what Marsilius meant by the human legislator? In other
words, what exactly, according to Marsilius, is the human legislator composed of?
Is it all the citizens of the state or only a few representatives of the multitude? In
chapter twelve of the Defender ofPeace Marsilius addresses this question:
Let us say, then, in accordance with the truth and the counsel of Aristotle,
Politics III chapter six, that the 'legislator' i.e. the primary and proper
efficient cause of the law, is the people or the universal body of the citizens
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or else its prevailing part (valentior pars) when, by means of an election or
will expressed in speech in a general assembly of the citizens, it commands
or determines, subject to temporal penalty or punishment, that something
should be done or omitted in respect of human civil acts (Marsilius [1324]
2005: 66).
Marsilius argues that the human legislator constitutes the people. This would
clearly mean that Marsilius recognised all members of the state or the universal
body of citizens as the human legislator. Yet Marsilius qualifies this with what he
describes as 'the prevailing or weightier part' (valentior pars). What does
Marsilius mean by the weightier part, and why does he include this qualification?
Many contemporary medieval analysts argue, that Marsilius introduces the
qualification of its prevailing! weightier part, 'on the grounds that it would be
unacceptable to allow a few deformed natures to impede decisions for the common
advantage' (Brett, 2005: xxiii). In other words Marsilius considers the prevailing
or weightier part to mean the multitude that comprise the universal body of
citizens save from a few that are in conflict with what is unavoidably the common
good. In simple terms, then, the prevailing part is the majority of citizens. Thus
Marsilius intentionally excludes the small group of people in conflict with the
common good, making clear that the prevailing part are the rest of the citizens,
both the 'quantity and the quality of persons in the community upon which the law
is passed' (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 67). Both these elements of quantity and
quality, in describing the prevailing part suggest that even in this sense Marsilius
considers those who consist of the human legislator as superior. It could thus be
argued that the qualification was only included for pragmatic reasons.
Marsilius clarifies this idea further when he speaks of the possibility of the
delegation of the legislative function:
This is so whether the said body of citizens or its prevailing part does this
directly of itself, or commits the task to another or others who are not and
cannot be the legislator and in an unqualified sense but only in a certain
respect and at a certain time and in accordance with the authority of the
primary legislator (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 67).
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Marsilius does not deem it compulsory for the universal body of citizens or its
prevailing part to directly make laws. He allows for the option of the citizens
assigning and entrusting the responsibility of making laws to some person or
persons, be they the ruler or regulator so long as the will of the people is
represented. Marsilius asserts that this will not undermine the superiority of the
human legislator, as the supreme legislator of the state can and will always be the
people. In addition the secondary legislator, be it the ruler or regulator, can only
serve a limited term in that position and will do so purely at the will of the primary
legislator. Thus there is always flexibility in this arrangement and security for the
citizens of the state, as ultimate authority is still with the human legislator, that is
the universal body of citizens or its prevailing part. Marsilius considers that the
election of rulers is the only valid way in which this process can take place.
Furthermore, once the ruler or regulator enacts laws, these laws are not permanent
or unalterable:
I say further that it is by the same authority that laws and anything else
instituted by the election must receive any addition or subtraction or even
total overhaul, any interpretation and any suspension: depending on the
demands of time and place and other circumstances that might make one of
those measures opportune for the sake of the common advantage in such
matters (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 67)
Marsilius grants allowances for changes to the law by the human legislator for the
sake of maintaining the common good. Since ultimate political authority is vested
in the hands of the human legislator, with them rests the power to undertake even a
complete overhaul oflaws. Such a modification of enacted laws is justified on the
basis that they might be wholly unsuitable for a certain place or context, and are
thus simply hindering the ability of achieving the common good. According to
Marsilius, it is also the duty of the human legislator to ensure that laws which are
enacted are pronounced to the citizens in the public realm, so as to ensure that no
citizen or person can claim ignorance for non-observance. All this is to ensure that
there is total compliance with the law and that the state is closer to realising its end
which is peace and tranquillity.
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So far I have clarified who the human legislator is, by providing and explaining
Marsilius's description of the universal body of citizens or its prevailing part. I
have not however examined in any detail Marsilius's conception of the citizen,
thus obscuring, however slightly, his conceptualisation of the human legislator. I
will explain what I mean by this below.
Marsilius does indeed engage with the idea of the citizen, offering a clearer and
more refined version of who is the human legislator:
I call a 'citizen', together with Aristotle in Politics III chapters 1,3 and 7,
one who participates in a civil community, in the principate or councillor
or judicial function, according to his rank. This description separates boys,
slaves, foreigners and women from citizens, although in different ways: for
the sons of citizens are citizens in proximate potential, lacking only age
(Marsilius [1324] 2005:67)
Marsilius describes the citizen as a person that is active in the civil community or
occupies a position in either in the government, council or judicial offices or part
of the state. By this definition Marsilius excludes all children, slaves, foreigners,
and women of whatever rank as citizens of the state, as each of these groups
possess specific limitations. Marsilius is thus referring to men who participate in
the civil community. One cannot hold Marsilius accountable for this type of
discriminatory and exclusionary vision of citizenship. To do this in my view
would be missing the point of Medieval political thought, which is informed to a
large extent by the realities of its historical and intellectual context. Also as
Marsilius states above, this definition of citizenship is largely borrowed from
Aristotle, who given his own context (i.e. the ancient Greek city-state) accepts a
very limited and subordinated role for women, slaves etc. I note also that Marsilius
does not include the members of the priestly office in this definition of citizenship.
Of course this makes sense if we consider that part of his great intellectual scheme
is to demolish the coercive and sovereign claims of the papacy in the sphere of the
temporal life.
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Marsilius extends this point further arguing that this specification of the human
legislator is there simply to ensure that the 'primary human authority', that is those
who pass and institute human laws, must 'belong' to those men 'from which alone
the best laws can result' (Marsilius [1324] 2005:68). But to whom is Marsilius
referring? Would not the best laws emerge from those most learned in the field of
legal science and jurisprudence, that is, the specialists of law? Marsilius argues
not. He is not referring to the experts oflaw, but rather to the universal body of
citizens or its prevailing part, which 'represents the whole of that body' (Marsilius
[1324] 2005: 68). Marsilius believes that this first proposition, which is that the
universal body of citizens or its prevailing part represents that whole body, is close
to self-evident.
Marsilius considers a second proposition. He argues that what is correct in the
matter oflaw, while at the same time of benefit to the state and the common good
of the citizens can only come about through the human legislator. This is because
the whole body of citizens strives 'in both understanding and inclination towards a
more certain judgement of its truth' and a 'more careful attention to its common
utility' (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 153). In other words the whole body of citizens
aims in both the intellectual and emotional sense towards achieving the common
good:
For the greater number is more able than anyone of its parts to notice a
defect regarding a proposed law since every whole - or at least, every
corporeal whole- is greater in mass and in strength than any part of it by
itself. Again from the universal multitude there results a greater attention to
a law's common utility, since no one willingly harms himself (Marsilius
[1324] 2005:69).
What then is the essence of Marsilius's logic as stated above? To begin with,
Marsilius employs a first principles approach, which presupposes that the common
good is what all men (except a deformed few) want and thus strive for. The
argument follows that legislation carried out by the universal body of citizens or
its prevailing part augurs the best results. On the other hand legislation by one or a
few is not certain to realise the common good. Marsilius contends that in respect
to legislation by the multitude, the advantage is that anyone is able to observe
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whether laws may favour one or a few. Furthermore, in view of the fact that the
multitude are involved in the creation of these laws once laws are enacted, 'they
are observed better... for the law would be redundant ifit were not obeyed'
(Marsilius[1324] 2005: 69). Such an argument is compelling mostly because it
identifies the common good as the 'sum of individual interests' (Black, 1992: 65).
This notion of the common good as that which can be harnessed by the collective
spirit takes for granted that the interests of all men are the same. It does not
consider for example the real problem of factional ism and self-interest. Of course
such considerations would undermine Marsilius's most fundamental principle of
demonstration which I have elaborated earlier in this discussion: 'a principle
naturally held and believed and freely conceded by all', which is that all men not
deficient or otherwise naturally desire a sufficient life (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 18).
Marsilius supports this second proposition with an argument that concerns the
issue of freedom. Marsilius argues that his initial declaration of the state as a
'community of free men' would be fundamentally challenged if one or few of the
citizens legislates (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 70). But why does Marsilius claim that
freedom in the state is obstructed if it were up to individuals and not the universal
body of citizens to legislate?
Marsilius provides several layers of reasoning to substantiate his argument. First,
laws passed on the authority of a few would promote individual interests and
despotism. Second, the remaining citizens of the state would refuse to subscribe to
such unjust laws and such contempt would breed unhappiness, protest and
eventual non-compliance. Third, in a counter scenario, if it were up to the
universal body of citizens to legislate, such unhappiness would be avoided, and all
citizens would gladly obey and accept laws that are passed. Fourth, if laws are
made in this way, where the multitude are given an audience or the power of
consent, citizens would willingly subscribe to laws knowing well that the
legislative process established the consent of the multitude, even if this process
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were less usefu1. 5 This is because it would seem to the citizen that he 'laid' the law
'upon himself and would thus see no cause for protest accepting the law with
'equanimity'(Marsilius [1324] 2005: 70). According to Marsilius, all this will
ensure that freedom in the state is not curtailed. 6
Marsilius justifies this second proposition from one last angle. Here he argues that
the power to impose obedience of laws belongs only to those who have the power
to coerce the transgressors oflaws (Marsilius [1324] 2005:70). As we have seen
elsewhere in this discussion, for Marsilius the power of coercion rests firmly in the
hands of the human legislator, or the universal body of citizens or its prevailing
part. It follows, then, that they are not only the ones with the authority to legislate,
but they also have effective coercive control over a particular territory.
Mm-silius's the01Y ofsovereignty
In order to ascertain Marsilius's notion of sovereignty one needs not to look for
something further than what has been said already. A doctrine of sovereignty is
one which argues that there is only one coercive jurisdictional power in the state.
In order words sovereignty 'is the claim to be the ultimate political authority,
subject to no higher power as regards the making and enforcing of political
decisions within a given territory' (Collin,1988:l96-l97 & McClean,1996:464).7
Marsilius undeniably produces such a doctrine. By this I mean that state
sovereignty, as Marsilius understood it, is exemplified in Marsilius's conception of
the universal body of citizens, which forms the human legislator. Marsilius grants
the power of coercive jurisdiction and authority to a single entity within the state
that is the human legislator, which is made up of the universal body of citizens or
5 An interesting debate has emerged from this point, that even if laws are less useful for the common
good they still have coercive force and are therefore binding, as it suggests that Marsilius is a legal
positivist. As Canning argues, whether Marsilius was proposing a kind oflegal positivism remains an
'unresolved debate among modem historians'. For more on this issue see (Coleman ,1999:154) and
Canning 'The role of power in the political thought of Marsilius ofPadua' (1999:29-32).
6 Marsilius does not offer a theory of freedom. As Brett argues, he merely gives a 'series of hints about
what it might be in the different domains of nature, politics and religion'. This is not because the
answer is 'unimportant' to him, but that, 'like the good life of which it is a crucial part, it is deferred'.
For more on this, see Brett , 'Politics, right(s) and human freedom in Marsilius ofPadua' (2006).
7 These are standard dictionary definitions of sovereignty as it has been conceptualized in political
theory.
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its prevailing part. This notion of sovereignty is best embodied in one of the
concluding statements of discourse one of the Defender ofPeace:
From what has been said in this chapter, and in chapters 9, 12, 13 and 15 of
this discourse, it can be concluded by clear demonstration that no
individual person, of whatever rank or status he may be, nor any collective
body has any principate or coercive jurisdiction over anyone in this world
unless that authority has been given to him or it directly by the divine or
human legislator (Marsilius [1324] 2005: 122).
It has been widely acknowledged by contemporary medieval historians and
analysts that this universal body of citizens is certainly a sovereign corporation,
clearly expressing the notion of sovereignty (see Black,1992 Coleman,1999
Ullmann,1965). Some have termed Marsilius's notion of sovereignty as 'medieval
corporation theory with a vengeance' (Coleman, 1999:137). But what is meant by
the corporation and how does this contribute to Marsilius's notion of sovereignty
8? To allow the reader to get a clearer sense of what I mean I will briefly look at
how Marsilius presented the notion of universal body of citizens as a sovereign
corporation.
From what we have learnt of Marsilius's political theory thus far we have seen that
Marsilius presents certain philosophical axioms, one of which he describes as the
truth which is self-evident to all man concerning the common good. This is a
standard ofjudgement which is used by all citizens to resolve whether a 'specific
law is worthy of consent or not' (Coleman, 1999:154). What is self-evident to
Marsilius concerning the common good is the notion of free individuals in a
multitude of free men whose will about the common good necessarily is the same
and can therefore be represented by the universal body of citizens or its prevailing
part. Differently expressed, Marsilius believed that the 'common good can only be
willed by each individual will, but its content is the same for all citizens'
(Coleman, 1999:154). Marsilius thus believes that the universal body of citizens or
8 Marsilius's corporation theory differs somewhat from that expressed by the jurists/civilian lawyers
such as Baldus. See Canning's 'Law, sovereignty and corporation theory' (1988: pp. 461-462)
For more on Marsilius's notion of corporation see Wilks 'Corporation and representation in the
Defensor Pads' (1972: pp.251-292).
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its prevailing part is more able to perceive what ought to be chosen and what
ought to be rejected than any of its parts by itself: 'every whole is greater than its
part, which is equally true in size or mass as in active power and action' (Marsilius
[1324] 2005: 75). The whole according to Marsilius consists ofa 'univocal,
rational will to the common advantage', which is individually stated by every
member (Coleman, 1999: 155). This is what corporation theory discourse is all
about. In a summary, it argues that:
A collected group of people, the multitude, can have their objective view
on the common advantage represented by the voice of one man or several,
that a representative can accurately mirror the collective will of a
community, a will that is the product of rationally logical interferences
from experiences. The faculty of will for Marsilius ...was always seen as a
cognitive function guided by reason. The will is not simply pure sensual
desire but a desire informed by what, for humans, it is reasonable to dersire
(Coleman, 1999:154).
In this regard, some have argued that Marsilius's notion of sovereignty which
belongs to the corporation of citizens is a 'kind of sovereignty that is unparalleled
in any medieval political theory' (Coleman, 1999: 138). This point it supported
significantly by Marsilius' s arguments in Discourse II of the Defender ofPeace.
Here, Marsilus's uses biblical and evangelical texts to justify that all temporal
powers of sovereignty exercised by the papacy, and characterised by the common
expression plenitude of power (p1enitudo potestasis) does not belong to the church
but rather to the one and only sovereign power of the state the universal body of
citizens, represented by the human legislator. 9 Thus, matters such as
excommunication, the dispensation of marriages and electing the office of the
prince are not papal privileges.
And what ofthe principate or ruler?
9 For a quick and informative summary of how Marsilius denies papal plenitude of power and accordsthe powers of sovereignty and coercion to only one entity in the state, the universal body of citizens orhuman legislator, see Discourse III of the Defender ofPeace, where Marsilius states the mainconclusions to be drawn from his book, pg's 547-558
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But what about the principate or ruler of the state, does he enjoy any sovereignty
considering that he might on occasion be instructed as the delegated secondary
legislator? Furthermore, does Marsilius's construction of the ruling office of the
state undermine in any way the sovereignty of the universal body of citizens? To
answer this question, and for the purposes of coherence and lucidity, I will now
review in a brief manner what is the relation of the principate to the universal
body of citizens.It has been apparent in my discussion thus far that Marsilius
considers two necessities for regulating the 'transitive acts' of human beings in the
state: 'a standard for what is equal or just' or law, and an 'equaliser or regulator to
bring actions into line with that standard', a principate (Brett, 2005:xxv). Much of
my discussion has been focussed on the former necessity and the manner in which
Marsilius uses it to demonstrate that the only viable sovereign and legitimate
political authority of the state is the universal body of citizens, who when gathered
together is the human legislator.
Although during the course of my discussion I have intimated Marsilius's notion
of the principate, the reader would not have until now developed a complete sense
of the role of the principate in relation to the state. Earlier in this discussion we
have seen that Marsilius argues that the princely/ruling office is the first of part of
the state that is to be instituted if the polity is to exist, and that the function of the
principate who occupies this position is to regulate actions in accordance with the
law. Furthermore the universal body of citizens or primary human legislator may
opt for the principate ruler to serve as the secondary legislator of the state.
Marsilius has also argued that there can be only one principate within any state.
Now, does the principate enjoy sovereignty given that he has the power of
regulator, of ensuring the well-functioning of the other parts of the state and a role
which necessitates coercion? Marsilius answer is simple and is summarised in the
final discourse of the Defender ofPeace:
The elected principate, or any other office, depends solely upon the
election of the body that has the authority for it, and upon no other
confirmation or approval ... That the election of any principate or other
office to be established through election, especially one which has coercive
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force, depends solely on the express will of the legislator (Marsilius [1324]
2005:549).
Marsilius's answer is that the ruler or prince is not the legislator, but rather the
'executor of a law' made by the legislator, whose function is merely to regulate
(Brett, 2005:xxvi). By this token he cannot be the sovereign authority of the state.
But what about the fact that Marsilius allows for the prince to be the secondary,
designated legislator? Even here, the prince will not be making laws for his benefit
and interest, as he can only enact laws that have been willed by the universal body
of citizens. In addition, the principate is also regulated by these laws, thus
confirming that true sovereignty is vested in only one political authority: the
universal body of citizens.
Conclusion
Marsilius of Padua does indeed articulate the notion of state territorial sovereignty
in his writing. He argues that sovereignty belongs to only one supreme political
authority the universitas civiurn (corporation of citizens). Marsilius achieves this
by developing a unique way of understanding the sovereign territorial state, that is,
by examining the structure, nature and role of the perfect community or state. He
argues that the perfect state is one which achieves peace and tranquillity and
attains the common advantage. This perfect state is characterised by a division of
its parts, which consists of offices tasked with specific functions. One of these for
example, is the executive or ruling office, which elects a principate to govern the
state. Marsilius used the argument of the necessity of law as a means of
maintaining the good functioning of these offices of the state. His final argument
is that the human legislator, which consists of the universal body of citizens or its
prevailing part, possesses a supreme sovereignty and can thus act as the only
coercive power in the state. Although Marsilius makes less reference to the idea of
territory I argue that territory is implicit in his notion of sovereignty. The reason




There has been a common charge of 'antiquarianism' regarding the study ofmedieval
political ideas by many intellectual historians who argue that this sort of study is
merely 'aimless medievalism' and historically and philosophically 'quite irrelevant if
not trivial' (Maitland cited in Ullmann,1965:229). Such an argument not only
overlooks the significance of medieval political ideas (which in themselves were
highly complex and conceptually remarkable) but also unashamedly disregards their
value to the broader study of the history of political thought. This thesis reveals how
one of the ideas developed in the late Middle Ages: the concept of state territorial
sovereignty has immense significance and value in any historical inquiry of the
origins of territorial sovereignty. It therefore considerably undermines any scorn of
antiquariasm with regards to the relevance of such a study and instead seeks to
highlight that even in the fourteenth century, thinkers, philosophers and jurists alike
were (given their context) extremely advanced in matters of the political.
By using the history of ideas method, this thesis has substantially demonstrated the
conceptual prowess of the writing of late medieval scholars such as Baldus de Ubaldis
and Marsilius of Padua on the subject of state territorial sovereignty. Both these
thinkers witnessed a significant development in their time, the consolidation of the
territorially sovereign state alongside other sovereign entities such as the empire and
the papacy. Their theoretical accounts therefore mirror the unique circumstances of
their historical context and thus reveal that they had specific historical objectives in
mind when writing their works.
By way of summary, I will highlight some of the significant points discussed in this
thesis, regarding Baldus and Marsilius's respective formulations of state territorial
sovereignty. Baldus's political thought for one constituted an acceptance of the
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universal claims of sovereignty of the emperor and pope as the basic starting point,
and from which he develops his argument for the sovereign territorial state. His use of
the juristic terms de iure and de facto sovereignty were highly innovative. He utilized
de facto sovereignty to justify the territorial sovereignty of territorial states, such as
cities, and de iure sovereignty to maintain the sovereignty of the emperor and pope.
This is done in a broader conceptual understanding of the hierarchy of sovereignty.
Baldus argues that de facto sovereignty can be conceptualised as something more than
just power without any legitimacy. He expands on the notion of de facto sovereignty
of the territorial state even further, using the role of consent in law-making and the
non-recognition of a superior as arguments for the territorial independence of these
states. His position was unlike that of the Neopolitans, another branch ofjuristic
thought evident during this period, which simply denied universal de iure sovereignty
of the empire and argued instead for a plurality of territorially sovereign states.
The theoretical nature of Marsilius's arguments, on the other hand, was quite
different. Being a philosopher and not a jurist, Marsilius' s project was 'intellectually
freer' as he could argue from 'first principles' rather than Roman law (Canning,
1999:34). His objective was to destroy the papal claim of universal sovereignty and
accord it to the only legitimate sovereign power in the state, the human legislator.
Marsilius achieved this by developing a unique way of understanding the sovereign
territorial state, that is, by examining the structure, nature and role of the perfect
community or state. He argued that the perfect state is one that achieves peace and
tranquillity and attains the common advantage.
Marsilius's perfect state is characterised by a division of its parts, which consists of
offices tasked with specific functions. One of these, for example, is the executive or
ruling office, which elects a principate to govern the state. Marsilius used the
argument of the necessity of law as a means of maintaining the well functioning of
these offices of the state. His final argument was that the human legislator, which
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consists of the universal body of citizens or its prevailing part, possesses a supreme
sovereignty and can thus act as the only coercive power in the state. Although
Marsilius makes less reference to the idea of territory it was argued that territory is
implicit in his notion of sovereignty. The reason it featured in a less prominent way as
compared to Baldus was because ofhis rigid following of ecclesiological arguments.
It is important to note that both Baldus and Marsilius' s ideas featured strongly in the
works oflater centuries and subsequent discussions on this subject of territorial
sovereignty. Marsilius's political thought for example continued to be prime sources
in later discussion of political thought. As Canning (1996: 186) points out, the writings
of 'Francisco de Vitoria, Jean Bodin, Francisco Suarez and Hugo Grotius, amongst
many others illustrates this trend'. Baldus's juristic ideas, too, became 'increasingly
consolidated' in sixteenth and seventeenth century political thought, where his
writings were not only referenced, but also of significant influence to prominent
writers such as Bodin:
Thus in the sixteenth century, quite apart from Italian jurisprudence which
continued almost universally to revere the medieval civilians and canonists,
the works ofFrenchjurists ... are full of references to Baldus... In Germany too
the reception of Roman law meant that Baldus's works became a pillar oflegal
education and practice .. .Into the seventeenth century... reference to Baldus is
frequently to be found in political writers. Bodin, for instance, made a very
large number of references to Baldus' works, although his use of Baldus has
not yet been systematically studied (Canning,1987:228-229).
Fourteenth century ideas of state territorial sovereignty were either 'quoted, followed,
amended or rejected' up until the modern period (Canning, 1996: 186). Although there
is a tendency to ignore the medieval period in the history of political ideas as a whole,
it is evident that in terms of scholarship the Middle Ages made distinctive, long-term
contributions to political thought. Hence, the impact ofmedieval political ideas in
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